
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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



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WORLDWIDE REPORT ÁRMS CONTROL

GENERAL

IZVESTI	YA Hits U.S. Plan To Test 'Nuclear Winter' Theory (A. Palladin; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 28 Jul 85)	1
USSR's	Arbatov on UN's Disarmament Role, SALT II (Georgiy Arbatov Interview; Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 26 Jul 85)	3
TASS R∈	eports House Nuclear Arms Moratorium Bill (Moscow TASS, 26 Jul 85)	6
Moscow	Weekly Reports Nuclear Arms Forum in Geneva (Vladimir Kuznetsov; Moscow MOSCOW NEWS, 14 Jul 85)	7
ussr:	CDE, Geneva Talks in Context of East-West Relations (Teygiz Gamkrelidze; Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA, 29 May 85)	. 9
FRG Tra	ade Union Leader Discusses Arms Issues in Moscow (Moscow TRUD, 27, 30 Jul 85; Hamburg DPA, 26 Jul 85)	15
	Moscow Press Conference, by P. Volpyanskiy DPA Report Joint Communique	15 15 16
Austral	lia, PRC Talks Focus on Nuclear Nonproliferation (Melbourne Overseas Service, 25, 26 Jul 85)	18
	PRC Rejects Treaty Hayden Urges Treaty Signing Talks With PRC End	18 18 19
Sino-A	ustralian Disarmament Talks (Beijing XINHUA, 25, 26 Jul 85)	20
	Qian Qichen Arrives in Canberra Talks 'Successful'	20 20

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

PRAVDA	Calls for Change in U.S. Stance (Editorial; Moscow PRAVDA, 1 Aug 85)	22
TASS:	U.S. Stand Obstructs Progress (Moscow TASS, 26 Jul 85)	28
PRAVDA	Hits Kampelman Remarks on SDI, Strategic Arms (Tomas Kolesnichenko; Moscow PRAVDA, 24 Jul 85)	30
Moscow	Weekly Radio Show Discusses Geneva Talks (Yuriy Kornilov, Spartak Beglov; Moscow Domestic Service, 28 Jul 85)	31
Soviet	General on SDI, New Strategic Arms, Euromissiles (Konstantin Mikhaylov Interview; Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 22 Jul 85)	34
Soviet	Officials, Scholars Take 'Optimistic' View of Talks (Wiktor Martinsen; Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET, 16 Jul 85)	36
U.S. St	tance at Second Round of Geneva Talks Assailed by GDR (Joachim Sonnenberg; East Berlin ADN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, 26 Jul 85)	38
	SPACE ARMS	
Soviet	Weekly Assails Japanese Interest in SDI (Y. Tavrovsky; Moscow NEW TIMES, No 26, Jun 85)	40
USSR:	Dangers of U.S. Military Space Programs Stressed (V. Israelyan, N. Neyland; Riga KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII, No 6, Jun 85)	43
Rome St	(Rome ANSA, 31 Jul 85)	55
Italy's	Andreotti Comments on SDI, Eureka (Giulio Andreotti Interview; Baden-Baden Suedwestfunk Network, 28 Jul 85)	56
Philips	Expects Little From SDI, Prefers Eureka Concept (Wubbo Tempel, Ben van der Velden; Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD, 25 Jun 85)	57
Portugu	uese Official Assesses Eureka Potential (Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 20 Jul 85)	60

Portuguese Satellite Station Seen as Contribution to SDI (Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 7 Jun 85)	61
SALT/START ISSUES	
Moscow Cites NEW YORK TIMES on U.S. 'Falsification' About SS-19 (Moscow World Service, 20 Jul 85)	63
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES	
TASS Cites UK Paper on U.S. Cruise Missile Tests in Canada (Moscow TASS, 19 Jul 85)	65
TASS Cites Dutch Labor Party: No Compromise on Missiles (Moscow TASS, 26 Jul 85)	66
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE	
IZVESTIYA Sees Signs of Progress at Close of Session (Yu. Rakhmaninov; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 27 Jul 85)	67
TASS Hits Speech of Swedish Chief Delegate (Moscow TASS, 25 Jul 85)	70
Yugoslav Disarmament Official on Helsinki Final Act (Belgrade TANJUG, 24 Jul 85)	71
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT	
TASS Reports Delegates' Speeches (Moscow TASS, 25, 30 Jul 85)	72
Chemical Arms Discussed Criticism of U.S.	72 73
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS	
Further Soviet Attacks on Congressional Binary-Arms Vote (Various sources, various dates)	74
Moscow World Service, by Viktor Olin IZVESTIYA Article Moscow Domestic Service	74 75 75
GDR's Axen Views SED-SPD Chemical Disarmament Plan (Hermann Axen; Paris LE MONDE, 25 Jul 85)	77

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS R	eports U.S. Officials' Remarks on New Zealand (Moscow TASS, 16, 31 Jul 85)	79
	Shultz 'Lashes Out' Armacost Interview	79 7 9
Soviet	Reports of Greek-Bulgarian Talks on Balkan NFZ Plan (Various sources, various dates)	80
	Zhivkov on Balkan Policy Athens Talks End Press Conference Constructive Contribution, by B. Rodionov	80 80 81 81
Briefs	South Pacific Talks	83
	NUCLEAR TESTING	
USSR:	Nuclear Test Ban Proposals Await U.S. Response (Gennadiy Shishkin; Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 27 Jul 85)	84
Moscow	: U.S. Invitation 'Legalization' of Explosions (Moscow in Japanese to Japan, 30 Jul 85)	87.
Briefs		
	Sweden Reports USSR Explosion TASS on U.S. Underground Test	88 88

IZVESTIYA HITS U.S. PLAN TO TEST 'NUCLEAR WINTER' THEORY

PM301052 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jul 85 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Palladin dispatch: "Staging a 'Nuclear Winter'"]

[Text] Any day now, if not any minute, a fire will flare up on a vast expanse of forest in northern Canada. Spruce, pine, and fir trees, set on fire by people, will perish in the flames and together with them -- the Pentagon hopes -- the theory of "nuclear winter" will turn to ashes or at least get scorched.

This is not the first time that the Land of the Maple Leaf has been used as a testing ground by Washington militarists. For the second year in succession, U.S.-produced cruise missiles are being tested in its air space: The Candian landscape, the Pentagon men explain cynically, is like a carbon copy of the plains, low hills, and copses of Russia. There is only one drawback: The best brains in the West, including in America itself, are warning that a war in which nuclear missiles are used is tantamount to suicide.

The explosions of nuclear shells, bombs, and warheads will cause fires everywhere resulting in a layer of ash and smoke that will form in the atmosphere that the sun's rays will not be able to penetrate. This will mean the beginning a new ice age, and anything that survives the nuclear massacre will freeze to death.

The evidence cited to corroborate the theory of "nuclear winter" is so incontrovertible that about 6 months ago even the Pentagon admitted that it is correct. Well, it may have admitted it, but it did not give up; it maintains that under certain circumstances, the apocalypse predicted by the scientists will not take place...some people may survive the barrage of nuclear bombs and missiles. And so the idea to commit to fire 800 hectares of forest in Canada's Ontario province was born.

According to the Pentagon wise men, the ashes from the conflagration will not stay in the skies for long. They will be dispersed by wind and fall back down to earth with rain and no ominous layer will form in the atmosphere. If that is the case, the people who are trying to inflict unprecedented calamities on mankind will have cause to celebrate the victory of obscurantism over reason. Milton Gillespie, a spokesman for the Pentagon's Defense Nuclear Agency, declared outright: The objective of the planned experiment is to clarify whether it is possible, when exchanging nuclear strikes to escape "nuclear winter."

The idea is new, as it were, but the reasoning is old -- it goes back to the concept of "limited nuclear wars." The authors of this crazy "theory" are trying to prove that a

worldwide nuclear battle does not, as they put it, threaten the existence of mankind. And the most dangerous aspect is that they do not just engage in abstract theorizing, but are calling for practical steps.

Involuntarily, the proposal put forward by the selfsame Washington administration to stage "a nuclear explosion for demonstration purposes" over the Atlantic comes to mind, accompanied as it was by advice to procure shovels and earth, in case the irreparable happened!

Gambling on the feelings of its fellow-citizens, the present U.S. Administration is confusing optimism with rashness, not to say recklessness.

USSR'S ARBATOV ON UN'S DISARMAMENT ROLE, SALT II

PM300956 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Jul 85 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Academician Georgiy Arbatov by V. Arsentyev: "A Community for Peace"]

[Text] The 39th UN General Assembly session declared 1985 United Nations Year and 1986 International Peace Year. In conversation with our correspondent, Academician Georgiy Arbatov, vice chairman of the Soviet UN Association, shared his thoughts about the role and place of the United Nations in present-day international relations.

[Arsentyev] The 40th anniversary of victory and the 40th anniversary of the United Nations did not coincide by accident. On 25 April 1945, the day the conference of UN founder-members opened in San Francisco, Soviet and U.S. forces met on the Elbe. The United Nations was born after the rout of fascist Germany. What is the main lesson in this for the present generation?

[Arbatov] Life experience acquired over the years and in-depth study of the historical process makes it possible to say that people will do something good for the international community only under pressure of circumstances and bitter experience or in an emergency. Take, for instance, the regulation of international relations and creation of an instrument that could promote that. It was only after World War I had ended that the League of Nations was set up. And although the "select club" was far from perfect, the lesson was not wasted. Some 5 million people perished in the conflagration of World War II. The world was again faced with the problem of arranging relations between states, and it was then that the United Nations came into being. And although the UN Charter and the United Nations itself were created on the eve of the nuclear and space age, which demanded a new variety of political thinking, it is impossible not to be struck by how firmly the organization is established in the fabric of international political reality today.

The United Nations is sometimes criticized for its shortcomings and weaknesses and accused of being too passive. But it cannot be better than the aggregate policy of the UN member states. It is not a question of the world organization's shortcomings, but of the policy of confrontation with the international community on the part of the United States, and sometimes it NATO partners.

In its desire to dictate to the United Nations Washington is often left isolated when discussing very urgent present-day problems.

[Arsentyev] When opposing repeated UN recommendations on freezing nuclear arsenals, U.S. spokesmen refer to the need first and foremost to get down to radically reducing these arsenals. Yet they invariably vote both against a freeze and against talks on nuclear disarmament. Thus, their true position can only be described as follows — neither a halt to the arms race, nor a radical reduction of nuclear weapons. How do you explain all this?

[Arbatov] In fact, there is much argument over this question in influential Washington circles as well as in the United Nations. The advocates of strong-arm solutions have made repeated attempts to alter the essential nature of the USSR's proposal and distort our stance. We propose a freeze, not instead of a reduction in nuclear weapons, but as a step which will make talks on nuclear arms reduction possible. I think that a "freeze" is inevitable, whether one wants it or not. A man who is running forward has first to stop in order to turn back. We are now witnessing a very unfortunate process: military technology is developing rapidly and armaments are being qualitatively improved, whereas diplomatic negotiations on arms limitation are progressing slowly. As a result it is yesterday's and the day before yesterday's problems that are being discussed, rather than the new ones arising out of the relentless movement forward of military programs. Therefore the only correct approach would be to regard a "freeze" as a step designed to create favorable conditions for further talks. It is a kind of litmus test of the true intentions of those who talk of the need to limit arms.

[Arsentyev] There have been too many assurances in America of devotion to UN ideals. But one is struck by the discrepancy between words and actions, between the fine slogans and the actual imperialist policy. Could the idea which prompted the creation of the United Nations ultimately perish in the same way?

[Arbatov] Yes, it could happen, unless the will of the majority in the United Nations is taken into account. At the moment all the U.S. Administration's actions say that a "world without the United Nations" would be more convenient for Washington in the implementation of its imperialist designs. The recent speech in San Francisco by Secretary of State G. Shultz on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the United Nations clearly demonstrated that the United States intends merely to turn the organization into an obedient performer of the will of Washington, which is trying to impose its ways, values, and ideals on the world. None of this is accidental. The only way I can view Washington's policy is as a policy geared to eliminating the setup established by the agreements and treaties that have been signed: to impede and nullify the possibility of talks and then torpedo the entire arms limitation process.

At the beginning Washington was quite open about this. If you take the statements by Reagan, Weinberger, and other Republican Party leaders during the 1980 election campaign and in the current administration's first year in office, they said that these treaties are not necessary, that they are harmful and even "fatally flawed." America would enter into talks only when it has achieved military superiority and could talk to the Soviet Union from a position of strength. But on encountering opposition to this line inside the country and among the allies the administration said that it agreed to observe SALT II and other signed agreements, that it was ready to enter into talks once again with the USSR. What is this, one wondered. A revised stance or a political maneuver to placate the opposition? Subsequent events showed that it was a maneuver, a new tactic, whereby treaty commitments are not eliminated at a stroke, but are cut off in thin slices, what they call in diplomatic language "salami" tactics.

One recent manifestation of these tactics was Reagan's speech in which he asserted that he would adhere to the SALT II treaty provisions, but on two conditions, or rather, violations. First: the components of the Poseidon nuclear submarine, which is being replaced by another, will not be destroyed but merely mothballed. Second: the United States will develop and test, despite UN resolutions and SALT II provisions, not one, but two ICBM's.

[Arsentyev] Through its spokesmen Washington is publicly calling for the "removal" of the UN headquarters from New York. How do you explain this?

[Arbatov] In America a negative attitude toward the United Nations has become a kind of test of conservatism, paving the way to the top. For that reason there is a greater need than ever before to strengthen UN activity.

For the first time in history a situation has been created where man is able to destroy himself as a biological species. This problem is older than nuclear weapons, which have brought things to a head; traditions of international behavior thousands of years old are becoming totally unserviceable and suicidal. History is presenting us with a challenge that no previous generation has faced. To be precise, either we do away with the arms race and war, or they will do away with us.

Of course, in this situation the United Nations cannot do everything. But it is the unique and the most powerful instrument we have at the moment to create new standards of international behavior. It makes it possible to live and think in a new way in a nuclear age despite all the differences and contradictions. People in our country are well aware of this and they value the organization highly.

United Nations Year is a special year; therefore we deem it important to remind people again and again that the United Nations was born out of mankind's supreme need for self-preservation and survival. It therefore deserves universal support.

TASS REPORTS HOUSE NUCLEAR ARMS MORATORIUM BILL

LD260621 Moscow TASS in English 0554 GMT 26 Jul 85

[Text] Washington July 26 TASS--TASS correspondent Igor Ignatiev reports:

A group of prominent political and public figures of the U.S. have announced the beginning of another campaign of American public in support for the proposal on the nuclear arms freeze.

Speaking at a press conference held here, Congressman Edward Markey (Democrat) said that a draft law on introducing a moratorium on the nuclear arms race had been submitted for the consideration of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. Specifically, the draft law urges the President to immediately start talks with the Soviet Union on working out a mutual and verifiable treaty on the banning of the tests, production and deployment of nuclear armaments. It also provides for the introduction of a moratorium by stages first on the tests and deployment of strategic weapon systems and space weapons, and then on all other types of nuclear weapons. It is suggested that the moratorium remain in force till the signing of a nuclear arms freeze treaty.

MOSCOW WEEKLY REPORTS NUCLEAR ARMS FORUM IN GENEVA

PM190803 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English 14 Jul 85 p 6

[Dispatch by Vladimir Kuznetsov: "Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan: to Get Out of the Nuclear Trap"]

[Text] Geneva -- "Nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and their consequences" was the subject of the colloquium, which was held in Geneva by the international Bellerive Group. The speakers included Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden; Senators Theodore Stevens and Edward Kennedy; Professor Kenneth Galbraith; astronomer Carl Sagan (all from the USA); Soviet scientists Yevgeniy Velikoh, Vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Institute of US and Canadian Studies, and Carlos Andres Perez, former President of Venezuela. All told, the colloquium was attended by some 500 politicians, military men, scientists and people from public, antiwar, and specialized UN organizations. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, President of the Bellerive Group, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, "The delegates pointed out with concern the growing danger of nuclear war and the militarization of our globe which threatens to penetrate outer space as well. Figuratively speaking, we are in a trap - going up on the escalator of the arms race and cannot get off it. The international community is living amidst a lack of security and because of that the nuclear age imposes upon us its own laws and decisions - the building up of ever bigger military arsenals which do not reduce the degree of vulnerability at all. We must take the nuclear weapons outside the framework of national security and decide the problems of peace within the context of international, universal security, as envisaged in the UN principles and Charter. Since 1945, 105 wars have been fought in the world, involving 66 countries. All of them are in the Third World. These wars have already claimed 16 million lives, and 12 of them are still going on.

"Some 15 states are today on the threshold of producing nuclear weapons and the danger of the violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty looms large. That is why the question of supporting and strengthening this Treaty is becoming of special importance, particularly that the conference on its reconsideration starts in September. The Non-Proliferation Treaty must become the basis for regional security and lay the foundations of disarmament. The Soviet-U.S. Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, which are called upon to put an end radically to the nuclear arms race on the Earth and around it, acquire

paramount importance in this context. It is indicated, on top of that, to stop all nuclear weapon tests and make a treaty banning these tests. This is the true way towards the stopping of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"The report of Soviet and US scientists at our forum stressed the grave climatic and genetic consequences of a nuclear war, known as the 'nuclear winter'. The huge explosions, equivalent in yield to 1.5 billion tons of TNT, and fires will eject a colossal amount of dust and ash into the atmosphere blotting out sunlight for several months. The tremendous force of free nuclear energy will destroy the layer of ozone in the atmosphere for 20-30 km and the deadly ultra-violet rays will gush to the surface of the Earth through holes in the troposphere. The apocalyptic picture will be supplemented by unprecedented floods, which, as the researches by Soviet scientists show, will happen as the result of the temperature drop between the surface of the land and the ocean, and tidal waves 100 meters high will wash away whatever may be left alive by that time. There are but some examples of the destructive nature of nuclear war, which would be the last war in our history.

"What then, is the way out? The speakers at our meeting analyzed the problem thoroughly. What is needed is to develop the confidence-building process, to stop looking at one another through the sights of nuclear missiles and submarines, and to stop aspiring for intimidation and achieving of unilateral advantages. It was proved convincingly at the colloquium that the nuclear arms race has gone beyond the limits of logic and that 90 percent of the nuclear arsenals could be liquidated immediately without any damage to the security of the great powers. In this context, I'd like to draw attention to the main report made by Olof Palme. He called on the world community to continue within the UN framework the search for the system of collective security, which would help solve the problem of averting nuclear war and guarantee the territorial integrity of states. The setting up of nuclear-free zones could be supported, as the prime minister stressed, by the implementation of the idea on the making of a 'non-nuclear corridor in Central Europe'. This would reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation in the most densely populated region on Earth.

"The ending of the nuclear arms race is the imperative demand of our time. How is it possible to squander 1.200 billion dollars every year on the arms race, when every fifth person lives in absolute poverty, in a state which may be called "quiet genocide"? Forty hundred and fifty million people [as published] suffer from hunger and malnutrition. Here are some more figures: 120 million school-age children do not go to school and 250 million children in the world have not received even an elementary education. Such are the sorry facts and paradoxes of the Earth's civilization. Our common task is to break this vicious circle and bring mankind on the way to coping with all its problems."

USSR: CDE, GENEVA TALKS IN CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 29 May $85\ p\ 3$

[Article by ZARYA VOSTOKA political reviewer Teygiz Gamkrelidze under the rubric "Following the Event: Facts and Commentary": "Parade of Hypocrisy"]

[Text]

[Box insert] Stockholm: Search for ways of European settlement/Geneva: New round of talks/Good will is necessary/Dangerous plans and hypocritical rhetoric of the overseas "peacemakers"/They wish to bury the truth.

Discussions have resumed in Stockholm concerning real steps which would promote normalization of the political climate on the European continent. The next round of the Soviet-American talks on space and nuclear arms begins tomorrow in Geneva.

Participants of the Stockholm Conference on measures for strengthening trust and security and on disarmament in Europe assembled in the Swedish capital for a new session of this forum, at which the delegations of 33 European countries as well as the United States and Canada are represented. The importance of the Geneva talks is common knowledge: the attention of the world public is riveted on them.

Representatives of the socialist countries emphasized in the very first statements in Stockholm that they will continue to bend every effort to come up with those solutions which would help divert the threat of nuclear war from the world, stop the arms race on Earth and prevent it in space. That is the permanent foreign policy line of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

The Soviet Union again demonstrated its will for peace in the Address "To Peoples, Parliaments and Governments of All Countries." This contains a proposal to subordinate the relations of powers possessing nuclear weapons to specific rules, including the obligation of not being the first to employ them. It includes the call to support the draft treaty on mutual non-use of military force, which would preclude the employment both of nuclear and conventional arms. It also includes an appeal to the states of Europe as well as to the United States and Canada to undertake effective steps to clear this continent both of medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons as well as chemical arms, to

promote the establishment of non-nuclear weapon zones, to reduce military expenditures, to take steps without delay to reach mutually acceptable understandings at the Stockholm Conference and the Vienna talks, and to settle the conflicts in Central America, the Near East and Southeast Asia by peaceful means and without intervention in the internal affairs of the countries located there...

We are awaiting a positive response to these proposals from western countries.

The Soviet Union recently made one other good-will gesture on its part by making the decision on a unilateral moratorium on further deployment of mediumrange missiles and on suspending the implementation of other retaliatory measures in Europe.

The Soviet Union supported the proposal to stop all nuclear tests by 6 August of this year—the 40th anniversary of the explosion of an atomic bomb over Hiroshima. This is just one of a number of steps undertaken by our country to achieve disarmament.

It could be expected that the U.S. government would welcome this proposal, but it hastened to reject it.

U.S. President Reagan made an address in which he admitted that the Stockholm Conference had a "unique opportunity to play an important role in improving relations between East and West." And what happened?

Matters did not go beyond these declarations—the American president repeated the West's previous position, characterized by an absence of a constructive and positive approach to the issues under discussion and by a policy, the postulates of which are based on hypocrisy and lies.

In this as well as other speeches by the president there was not even a hint of readiness to take a businesslike attitude toward the new Soviet proposals, which open the way out of the dead end into which Washington would like to take Soviet-American relations. For example, the actual response to the unilateral moratorium introduced by the Soviet Union was a continuation of deployment of Pershing II missiles on FRG territory and, as it turns out (in clear violation of pledges made by the United States to the allies themselves), it plans to deploy not 108, but 258 Pershing II's on FRG territory.

The Reagan administration played the hypocritical game with words about "freedom," "peace" and "partnership" earlier as well, but this time especially refined flows of lies and slander fell from the White House against the Soviet Union, Cuba and other countries of the socialist community.

What hypocrisy must one have to speak, in a message of greeting sent to Moscow, about the desire to go together "along the path of new progress toward goals of attaining a more stable peace and eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth," and at the European Parliament in Strasbourg to impudently slander the USSR, falsely accusing it of "aggressiveness" and ascribing to us the intent of "delivering a first strike" with nuclear forces, although the

entire world knows of the Soviet Union's pledge not to be first to use nuclear weapons, made unilaterally in 1982 and solemnly confirmed on the 40th anniversary of the Victory.

Washington lies when it asserts that the USSR began the arms race in space, and it leads people astray by saying that the United States is concerned only with defense, and our country is concerned only with offensive arms. Washington allows irresponsible statements to the effect that the USSR is not observing its recently announced moratorium. Washington resorts to deception in asserting that the Soviet Union has "nuclear superiority." And Washington casts prudence to the wind to prove that U.S. space plans are exceptionally "humane" and that this is only scientific research, at the end of which the United States can reject deployment of a widescale system of space-based ballistic missile defense...

It is a lie deeply entangled in hypocrisy and pharisaism.

And who does not see clearly that U.S. readiness "to promote the elimination of the artificial division of Europe" conceals plans for a revision of postwar frontiers, the "absorption" of the GDR by West Germany, and a change of the social systems in other socialist states?

The "peace proposals" of the head of the U.S. administration which were advertised in advance include not only such secondary measures as the establishment of a permanent military communications line or the meeting of military representatives, but they also reanimate the proposal on legalizing espionage under the guise of strengthening trust, which was advanced by NATO countries at the Stockholm Conference. These pseudopeaceloving proposals are nothing more than mimicry and a diversionary maneuver undertaken in the face of the specific and important USSR initiatives.

V. I. Lenin warned back at the beginning of the present century that the rapid growth of science and technology was opening up not only the greatest opportunities, but also the greatest dangers. Lenin foresaw that in the hands of imperialist reactionaries the fruits of scientific-technical progress can lead to an undermining of the very conditions for existence of a human society. Socialism specifically sees one of its historic tasks to be to make it impossible to use the knowledge achieved by science against man.

By developing systems of space arms, the Reagan administration hopes to establish nuclear domination over the entire world, writes Howard Parsons, a well-known American scientist and a professor of philosophy at Bridgeport University.

The contradictory and hypocritical position taken by the United States at the Geneva talks is disrupting all efforts aimed at achieving reasonable agreements. Washington does not wish disarmament. The Pentagon asserts that the tests it is conducting under the "star wars" program allegedly are not in violation of provisions of the ABM Treaty. At the same time, the American Defense Department is retaining the "right" to ignore this treaty, referring here to mythical "violations" of the treaty on the part of the Soviet Union.

It is difficult to say what is greater here: the lies or the hypocrisy.

The fact is that the Reagan administration already is moving on to practical tests of components of a widescale ballistic missile defense system with their placement in outer space.

According to a Pentagon announcement, there will be tests of one of the important components of the "star wars" system during the flight of the Discovery spacecraft planned for mid-June: equipment for precise guidance of a laser beam from Earth to objects flying in near-Earth space.

The purpose of this program also is well known. A system stationed in space and capable of detecting and destroying an ascending missile in a matter of minutes also can destroy means of national verification and warning intended for notification of nuclear attack. Thus their destruction (as admitted by American military personnel as well) serves as preparation of a first strike and actually is tantamount to nuclear attack.

Washington can deliver a first strike only after being certain that a retaliatory strike will not be disastrous for the United States itself. They are specifically trying to develop the ABM system to guarantee the impunity of the aggressor.

And finally, there are no guarantees that under the pretext of deploying ABM space stations, an offensive attack system intended for destroying strategic targets on Earth will not be secretly deployed. The United States always has tried to encircle the USSR with nuclear bases, and space will become a sphere for deployment of new strategic weapons.

The U.S. imperialist circles are looking at relations with other states through the notch of a gunsight. "Peace always will have to be built only on strength" is the principal postulate of White House politicians. And so they intimidate taxpayers in the United States and other NATO countries by the fact that allegedly "the shadow of Soviet power hovers" over Western Europe, Africa and Central America. Meanwhile, they themselves are developing more and more new military facilities in an attempt to enmesh Europe and other continents in a network of aggressive bases.

A new tracking station now is being established in Portugal, in the small town of (Talef dush Causadush).

In the opinion of the newspaper DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, this station, which is part of the Space Track space system, will close a ring with which the Pentagon has girdled the globe. Construction of this station is directly related to the notorious "strategic defense iniitative" of the U.S. president or, in other words, to the "star wars" program. Three such facilities having the primary purpose of maintaining communications with U.S. military spy satellites already have become operational: in the American state of New Mexico, in the Hawaiian Islands and in South Korea. Construction of a fourth station is under way on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The station in the south of Portugal will be the final link. It will be directly subordinate to the North American Joint Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

A large radar has been set up on the island of Shemya in the Aleutian Islands. Components tested for the purpose of ballistic missile defense were used in its construction in violation of agreed understandings. This station can be used to establish a radar field for ballistic missile defense of U.S. territory, which contradicts the obligation of Article I of the ABM Treaty.

Construction of large radars such as the Pave Paws, the specifications of which have been taken to the level of requirements for ABM radars, also represents a similar violation of the treaty: establishment of a radar field covering a large portion of U.S. territory. Two of those radars already have been built on the U.S. west and east coasts, and construction of another two is under way in the south.

The United States is building a large Pave Paws radar far beyond the limits of its territory, in Greenland, in violation of the obligation "not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward."

Millions of people throughout the world are asking the question: Why is there no progress at Geneva? The United States is employing the tactics of an open prolongation of the dialogue here. This is being done to build up arsenals of strategic offensive arms, and particularly the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, behind the screen of talks. The stationing of new American mediumrange nuclear missiles in Western Europe is continuing. At the same time it is common knowledge that the United States is making new efforts to accelerate the "star wars" program.

All this is being done under the hypocritical and false pretense of intimidating the Americans with the old myth of the "Soviet threat." Devout professional liars from the Reagan administration boast of their peaceful intentions at Geneva and even propagandize the "star wars" program as a "step toward peace." This lie is being created to justify the mad dream of a victory in the "star wars."

Washington views the future of mankind and particularly the future of American-Soviet relations exclusively in military terms, as a clash under the slogan "Better dead than Red" with the use of the entire arsenal of the most destructive means of warfare. It is assumed here that the possession of space arms should predetermine the outcome of this clash in favor of the United States.

An authoritative American journal such as the BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS writes that, as shown by an analysis of recent administration statements, the president's policy is aimed at persuading the public and Congress that modernization of nuclear arsenals and arms control are one and the same. "I am convinced more and more that the White House doesn't want arms limitation agreements unless they provide the United States with strategic superiority," emphasizes H. Brown, chief editor of the journal.

In violation of the understandings reached, Washington is altogether refusing to discuss the question of nonproliferation of the arms race to outer space simultaneously with a discussion of the question of nuclear arms limitation and reduction.

Regarding the myth of the "Soviet military threat," wasn't it really from the USSR and other socialist countries that there came practical, realistically feasible proposals to clear all kinds of nuclear weapons from Europe and destroy chemical weapons and other kinds of deadly arms? Wasn't it really the countries of the socialist community which repeatedly proposed to exclude the use of military force in deciding thorny issues among states?

The recent meeting in Warsaw again refuted the false thesis of imperialist propaganda, which attempts to place responsibility on the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist countries for the split of Europe and the postwar world. History bears witness that this was done by the creators of NATO. Moreover, as participants of the Warsaw meeting again reminded us, the socialist states have repeatedly expressed a readiness to dissolve the Warsaw Treaty if NATO agrees to do the same. Many major initiatives aimed at strengthening peace in Europe and at detente are specifically connected with the Warsaw Treaty. The Warsaw meeting confirmed the general readiness of socialist countries to continue to collectively seek ways to eliminate the threat of war and expand international cooperation.

At the same time, the unanimous decision to extend the effective period of the Warsaw Treaty was dictated by a need to ensure the security of fraternal allied states and to keep their defensive capability at the proper level. The Czechoslovak RUDE PRAVO recalls in this connection the words of Lenin that a revolution must be able to defend itself.

The Soviet land is entering a period of preparation for the upcoming 27th CPSU Congress. Our party's recent April Central Committee Plenum defined the basic lines of preparation for the congress, which should be a milestone in the country's history. Profound comprehension of the existing situation, bold decisions and vigorous action are what the party Central Committee is calling for from the entire people. The fact is that further changes and transformations and the attainment of a new qualitative status of socialist society lie ahead.

Peace is necessary for this.

The Land of Soviets and other socialist states are demonstrating their constant adherence to the cause of peace. We spared no cost for victory in the war and we will spare no cost for the victory of peace on Earth.

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FRG TRADE UNION LEADER DISCUSSES ARMS ISSUES IN MOSCOW

Moscow Press Conference

PM291540 Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Jul 85 p 3

[Report by P. Volpyanskiy: "DGB Delegation Press Conference"]

[Excerpts] A press conference on the results of the visit by a delegation from the German Trade Union Federation [DGB] headed by DGB chairman E. Breit, which has been in our country at the invitation of the AUCCTU, was held in Moscow yesterday for Soviet and foreign journalists. The press conference was opened by AUCCTU Secretary A.M. Stubbotin.

Delivering the opening statement, E. Breit noted that during the talks between the AUCCTU and DGB delegations there was an extensive exchange of opinions on various aspects of the activity of the two countries' trade unions and their positions on various problems of the day.

E. Breit made a high assessment of the meeting with A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. We had a frank talk, E. Breit said, and at times expressed differing viewpoints. But we were unanimous on the main point, the need to maintain and strengthen peace and continue the search for ways of ensuring disarmament and not just limiting the arms race.

Replying to numerous questions from representatives of the press, E. Breit devoted great attention to the specific content of cooperation between FRG and Soviet trade unions. He noted that it is planned to continue exchanges of lecturers between trade union journalists will be developed. It is also planned to expand exchanges of youth delegations. During the talks the possibility of joint AUCCTU and DGB events devoted to the next anniversary of the signing of the treaty between the USSR and the FRG was discussed. E. Breit advocated the continuation and development of ties between individual labor collectives in both countries.

DPA Report

LD261636 Hamburg DPA in German 1519 GMT 26 Jul 85

[Text] Moscow, 26 (DPA) -- The chairman of the West German Trade Union Federation (DGB) Ernst Breit, discussed questions concerning bilateral relations, the securing of peace and disarmament, and also the reuniting of families, at his meeting with the Soviet head of state Andrey Gromyko in Moscow. Speaking to the press in Moscow, Breit described

the course of the talk as "very open and frank." Both are of the opinion that peace must be secured and, in places where it does not exist today, be created. Both believe that "one must at long last move to disarmament and not just a slowdown of the arms buildup, which had been the best achieved so far," Breit said.

However, there were differing views on the causes of the current situation. This is not only a question of counting weapons, Breit said. "Above all this is a question of the policies of the two superpowers." If this policy did not lead to the two superpowers "developing a minimum level of trust in each other's honesty, then all attempts to reach disarmament would have no prospects." According to Breit, this also includes the question of the superpowers' approach in the case of Nicaragua, their behavior in the case of Afghanistan, and their attitude toward "military conflicts."

In this connection Breit named the Near East, East Asia, the Iran-Iraq war and South Africa. "All these things have developed and are taking place not without the influence of the two superpowers." He is certainly inclined, Breit said, to give an equal measure of responsibility to each. There will only be calm when both superpowers really seriously want this. In his opinion the detente policy of past years (?would be) one possibility for this. But there is also another side to the coin. Lenin was supposed to have said that trust is good but control better. "This is of great significance as far as disarmament questions are concerned," Breit said. As long as there is no real success in achieving effective reciprocal checks there can be no guarantee that "there is real disarmament."

A DGB delegation led by Breit is in Moscow till Saturday. Discussions have also been held with the Soviet trade union leader Stepan Shalayev. Questions relating to future cooperation between the two trade union federations and the exchange of delegations were discussed. Breit said that Shalayev was invited to take part in the next DGB congress in May in Hamburg.

Joint Communique

PM311331 Moscow TRUD in Russian 30 Jul 85 p 3

[Text of the "Joint Communique of the AUCCTU and the German Trade Union Federation"]

[Excerpt] A delegation from the German Trade Union Federation headed by DGB chairman E. Breit visited the USSR from 24 July through 27 July 1985 at the AUCCTU's invitation. The delegation consisted of Gustav Fehrenbach, deputy chairman of the DGB, Michael Gevenich, member of the Executive Committee of the DGB federal board, Erwin (Kristoffersen), chief of the DGB international section, and Werner Millert, personal adviser to the DGB chairman. After a meeting at the AUCCTU the DGB delegation had a detailed conversation with A. A. Gromyko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

During their stay in Moscow the delegation members visited the 50-Letiya SSSR Automated Flowing Plant, where they were shown the organization of the production process and the main areas of the trade union's work.

Talks were held at the AUCCTU in which the following took part for the Soviet side: S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the AUCCTU; A.M. Subbotin, secretary of the AUCCTU; V.N. Shuruyev, chief of the AUCCTU's Wages and Economic Work Division; V. Ye. Mozhayev,

chief of the AUCCTU's International Division; and A.A. Remizov, deputy chief of the AUCCTU International Division.

The sides exchanged reports on the domestic economic and social situation in the USSR and FRG and discussed questions of bilateral and European trade union cooperation.

Profound concern was expressed at the serious international situation and the continuing arms race on earth and in space. The sides stressed the need for urgent measures to reduce the military danger. The AUCCTU and DGB welcome the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on all space and nuclear arms questions and express the working people's hope that the talks will end with accords aimed at preventing the militarization of space and eliminating nuclear armaments. They expect that the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan next November will give new impetus to those talks.

The representatives of both trade unions agreed that trade unions must use their full potential in the antiwar struggle, be more vigorous in their support for the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, and comprehensively promote the implementation of the decisions of the all-European conference in Helsinki, whose 10th anniversary will be marked this year.

cso: 5200/1340

AUSTRALIA, PRC TALKS FOCUS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

PRC Rejects Treaty

BK250204 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0130 GMT 25 Jul 85

[Text] China's deputy foreign minister, Mr Qian Qichen, has arrived in Australia for talks on disarmament and arms control. Mr Qian heads a delegation of Chinese Government officials which will have 2 days of talks in Canberra with the foreign affairs minister, Mr Hayden.

Speaking to Radio Australia in Beijing before leaving, Mr Qian said China opposed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty that Australia would like it to sign. He said China was against nuclear proliferation. However, China did not support the nonproliferation treaty because it discriminated against nonnuclear countries.

Mr Qian said China's development of nuclear weapons was solely defensive and to break the nuclear monopoly of the superpowers. He added that only the superpowers were capable of launching a world war and said China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Hayden Urges Treaty Signing

BK250948 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0830 GMT 25 Jul 85

[Text] Australia's foreign minister, Mr Bill Hayden, has urged China to become a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Mr Hayden was speaking in Canberra at the opening of 2 days of talks on disarmament and arms control with a visiting Chinese delegation led by China's deputy foreign minister, Mr Qian Qichen.

Mr Hayden told the delegation that he believed the Nonpoliferation Treaty to be the key to effective prohibitions on nuclear weapons. In his reply, Mr Qian called on the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue an arms control agreement so that East-West relations could be relaxed.

Before leaving Beijing, however, Mr. Qian told Radio Australia China was against nuclear proliferation but did not support the treaty because it discriminated against nonnuclear countries.

Talks With PRC End

BK261300 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 1230 GMT 26 Jul 85

[Text] Australia's minister for foreign affairs, Mr. Hayden, says there are substantial areas of agreement between Australia and China on arms control and disarmament. Speaking in Canberra at the end of 2 days of high-level talks between Australia and China, Mr Hayden said differences emerged on the subject of China's reluctance to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty. However, he said Australia had received support from China for the proposal for a Pacific nuclear-free zone and had received strong encouragement for its effort to complete a chemical warfare convention.

The head of the Australian delegation, Mr Duncan Campbell, said there was also the strong impression from the Chinese delegation that China had no intention of resuming atmospheric nuclear tests. The Chinese delegation was led by a deputy foreign minister, Qian Qichen.

cso: 5200/4345

SINO-AUSTRALIAN DISARMAMENT TALKS

Qian Qichen Arrives in Canberra

OW251938 Beijing XINHUA in English 1906 GMT 25 Jul 85

[Text] Canberra, July 25 (XINHUA) -- Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Deputy Secretary A.D. Campbell of the Australian Foreign Minstry shared same or similiar views during their talks on arms control and disarmament here this afternoon.

Campbell stressed Australia's stand of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and that the Pacific should be a peaceful ocean. Qian said that China would give support to all that could contribute to peace and stability in this region.

The talks followed a welcoming ceremony at which Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden said he appreciated the good relations between Australia and China and he looked forward to detailed exchange of opinions on issues of common concern with Qian.

Qian said China hoped the U.S. and the Soviet Union would continue their negotiations on disarmament and reach agreements that would not damage the interests of any third party.

China has always advocated a comprehensive and thorough disarmament, not only in nuclear arms but also in conventional arms, he noted.

Qian arrived in Sydney this morning and later flew in Canberra. This evening, Chinese Ambassador to Australia Nie Gongcheng hosted a dinner for the visit of Qian. Hayden and many other high-ranking Australian officials were present.

Talks 'Successful'

OW261945 Beijing XINHUA in English 1909 GMT 26 Jul 85

[Text] Canberra, July 26 (XINHUA) -- Visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen [title as received] and Deputy Secretary A.D. Campbell of the Australian Foreign Ministry today successfully concluded here the second round of talks on arms control and disarmament.

The two sides expressed determination to make further joint efforts for peace and stability in Asia, the Pacific and the world. An Australian spokesman told the press this afternoon that the talks are "successful".

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The spokesman said, "a very strong impression" he had after two sessions of the talks yesterday and today is that "we do have a sense of convergence of attitudes in the whole area of arms control and disarmament."

He said the topics at the talks included the South Pacific nuclear-free zone, the nuclear non-proliferation, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the NPT review conference in Geneva this September, and the U.S.-Soviet arms talks.

He concluded that "I think we can now say that we are on the business of active cooperation with China in the disarmament and arms control area, and we have found that we have a number of shared perspectives both globally and regionally."

Qian and his party will fly to Sydney tomorrow and stay there one day before returning

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

PRAVDA CALLS FOR CHANGE IN U.S. STANCE

PM311630 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Aug 85 First Edition pp 4, 5

[Editorial article: "What Is Hampering Progress at the Geneva Talks" -- uppercase passages published in boldface]

[Text] The arms race, which is continuing due to the actions of Western imperialist circles, and the further buildup and improvement of weaponry confront mankind with a choice; either stopping and reversing this dangerous process by means of resolute efforts or allowing the race to hopelessly overwhelm human civilization and call its very existence into question. The Soviet Union is doing everything to remove the threat hanging over the world. Its policy in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction is geared to this. The Soviet Union's recent decision to unilaterally end any nuclear explosions as of 6 August is a vivid illustration of that.

It was also due to the desire to promote the achievement of this noble goal that the USSR went to the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms that began on the Soviet initiative in Geneva last March. The second round of talks ended recently. Like the first, they brought no progress in resolving the problems under discussion.

You might think enough time had passed since the start of the talks for all sides to have been able to set out their approaches to the issues under discussion, submit specific proposals, and start a businesslike practical dialogue. It was all the more natural to expect this in that the delegations' work did not begin from scratch. Last January in Geneva the leaders of the USSR and U.S. foreign policy departments agreed on fundamental theses regarding the subject matter and aims of the talks and the method for examining and resolving the relevant problems. It has been stated that the "complex of issues relating to space and nuclear arms, strategic and medium-range," is the subject of the talks. The aim is the "formulation of effective accords aimed at preventing an arms race in space and ending it on earth, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability." All questions at the talks must be examined and resolved comprehensively, as an interconnected whole.

Nonetheless, matters have not moved a single step forward over the past months. Why is this?

In order to answer that question, let us see what has been done to fulfill the tasks set by the January accord.

The task is set of preventing an arms race in space and ending it on earth. What could be more natural to start progress toward this goal than the immediate ending of any actions that would run counter to it? That is as clear as the fact that you cannot put a train into reverse without stopping it.

The Soviet side, which during the first round proposed establishing a moratorium on nuclear and space arms for the entire period of the talks persistently raised the question of reaching an accord about this during the second round. Such a step would certainly ensure a more favorable atmosphere at the talks and would strengthen trust. Neither side would fear that while the talks were going on, the other side was engaged in activity that might effectively undermine the future agreement.

However, the American side is opposed to this. It continued to present "arguments" for avoiding the step proposed by the USSR.

For instance, it was claimed the establishment of a moratorium would perpetuate some sort of Soviet nuclear superiority.

The absurdity and contradictoriness of this claim is self-evident. What kind of Soviet "superiority" can there be in terms of strategic arms? It is well known that parity exists between the USSR and the United States in this sphere. This fact is recognized in the West. It has been repeatedly noted in UN decisions. Even in the United States itself it goes without saying: The joint Chiefs of Staff report to Congress (1985) states that "in the period in question approximate nuclear parity has existed between the United States and the USSR." It turns out that the U.S. side in Geneva is attempting to deny something that is stated by competent official organs in Washington.

Approximate equality, taking into account the measures taken by the Soviet Union in response to the deployment of new U.S. missiles in a number of West European countries, also exists in the sphere of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe. If the United States was really concerned at the "threatening" growth of Soviet nuclear forces, as Washington likes to clamor, then by all the laws of logic it should be interested in stopping that growth. But, the American side is avoiding businesslike discussion even of the idea of a moratorium. Why? There can only be one answer: It does not want to stop its own programs for the buildup of first strike nuclear forces, both in the sphere of strategic offensive arms and in the sphere of medium-range nuclear means, which are aimed at smashing the equilibrium and attaining a position of superiority.

When it comes to space, the baselessness of the U.S. claims regarding the freezing of "Soviet superiority" as a result of the establishment of a moratorium is even more self-evident. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union is not conducting any work aimed at creating space offensive arms. The moratorium on being the first to put antisatellite weapons in space unilaterally announced by the USSR, has been in force for 2 years now. The United States not only refuses to join in this step, but is also working toward large-scale tests of its antisatellite system.

In general, what kind of "perpetuation of Soviet superiority" can there be if the proposed moratorium on nuclear and space arms were only a temporary measure on the way to arms limitations and reductions and agreements ensuring the equality and identical security of the sides.

The Soviet side has continued to strive persistently for the start of a practical discussion in Geneva of measures to PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE. To this end, it is proposed that the entire class of space offensive arms be banned and agreement reached on precluding the development, starting from the stage of scientific research work,— testing, and deployment of such means. Everything that the sides currently possess in this class of arms,— that is antisatellite means,— must be scrapped.

The Soviet side stresses the need for strict and unswerving compliance with the 1972 Soviet-American treaty of unlimited duration on the limitation of ABM systems, considering it inadmissible to call into question its future existence [perspektiva ego sushchestovovaniya], as the United States is doing by having embarked on preparations for the destruction of the treaty with its so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" program.

As before, the U.S. side continues to refuse to seek agreement on the prevention of an arms race in space. Instead, it is in practice advocating the sides undertake a race involving space offensive arms using arguments about seeking some "framework for making the transition to a system envisaging a more stable combination of offensive and defensive forces."

At the same time, the objective reality is that strategic stability can be safeguarded only if there is a total ban on space offensive arms and large-scale ABM systems, including space antimissile systems. A ban accompanied by stringent limitations on and deep reductions in nuclear arms. This reality formed the basis for the elaboration of the ABM treaty and constitutes the foundation of the entire strategic arms limitation process. It is an abiding reality, irrespective of the technical level that weapons development has reached. If the ABM treaty were to be undermined for some reason, this foundation would also disappear. Erosion of the ABM treaty and especially attempts to jeopardize its very existence are therefore inadmissible.

The American side's position on space questions is overtly at variance with the task of preventing an arms race in space and continues to play the role of a dense wall obstructing the path to reaching an accord.

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On the problem of STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, the Soviet side has sought, as a package and an interconnected whole with the solution of the problem of preventing an arms race in space, to reach an accord on the radical reduction of strategic means, ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers, with a simultaneous renunciation by the sides of programs for the development and deployment of new forms and types of strategic arms or the stringent limitation of such programs. The reductions should apply to both the delivery vehicles and the total number of nuclear charges carried on them. The total renunciation of such new and dangerous types of strategic offensive arms as long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes is also proposed.

When advocating during the strategic arms limitation and reduction talks, the reduction of strategic offensive arms by one-fourth, the Soviet side expressed a readiness to go even further; to carry out more radical reductions of the sides' strategic nuclear arsenals. Here, of course, consideration would also have to be given as to how the question of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe would be resolved since the U.S. medium-range arms being sited within range of USSR territory are in practice of strategic significance for the USSR.

Implementation of the Soviet proposals would make it possible to erect a reliable barrier against the arms race on earth. Strategic stability throughout the world would be substantially strengthened. A great contribution would be made to the cause of eliminating nuclear weapons completely and everywhere.

In this area of the talks — the U.S. side has essentially confined itself to mere declarations of its desire for the reduction of strategic arms. But in practice, it has steered a line aimed at achieving precisely the reverse, the legalization of the buildup of such arms, primarily in those areas where Washington hopes to secure advantages for itself. If there has been any talk about reductions it has only been in the context of those arms, primarily ICBM's, and chiefly Soviet, which form the foundation of the USSR's strategic potential.

Thus, when reproducing its 2-year-old proposal for the number of nuclear charges on ballistic missiles (ICBM's and SLBM's) to be limited to 5,000, the U.S. side was advocating solutions for strategic bomber nuclear charges and long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes where, after the proposed "reduction" the number of nuclear charges on strategic offensive arms could be at least three times the proposed 5,000 level and even exceed the current total. Is this a reduction?

When discussing the questions of strategic offensive means, the U.S. side pretended they were not interconnected with the problem of space arms.

This does not display a desire to seek a mutually acceptable solution. For limitations and especially substantial reductions of nuclear arsenals are inconceivable under the conditions of an arms race in space. On the contrary, a space offensive arms race will only spur on the arms race in all fields.

It is clear that the U.S. side's position on strategic offensive arms does not offer an opportunity for progress in this area of the talks either.

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In the area of MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MEANS in Europe, the Soviet side put forward a broad program of actions aimed at achieving an honest, fair solution to the problem. In order to immediately halt the race in such arms on the European Continent, the USSR advocated the establishment here of a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles about which it would be ready to reach agreement both in the context of a general moratorium on nuclear and space weapons, and also on a separate basis.

The USSR backed up its proposal with a unilateral action of tremendous political significance by halting, as of last April, the deployment of medium-range missiles and by halting the buildup of other retaliatory measures in Europe.

Viewing the moratorium merely as a bridge to the reduction of medium-range nuclear means in Europe, the Soviet side put forward specific proposals regarding such reductions.

The main idea of the Soviet approach is that, as a result of reductions in Europe, a strict balance would be established and maintained between the USSR and NATO in terms of medium-range nuclear means at a radically lower level.

With regard to missiles, a solution is proposed whereby the United States would withdraw its Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles from Europe and the USSR would

reduce its medium-range missiles in the European zone to a level equivalent, when warheads are counted, to the corresponding nuclear armaments of Britain and France, NATO allies of the United States. This would give the Soviet Union the opportunity to also revoke other measures which were taken in response to the deployment of new American missiles in Europe. As a result, the USSR would not have a single warhead more on medium-range missiles in Europe than those in the NATO countries' corresponding nuclear arsenal deployed against the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries. The confrontation between the USSR and the United States in Europe in this form of armaments would be reduced to the lowest of all possible levels, zero.

The Soviet side also advocated the reduction of medium-range aviation means; the establishment and maintenance of an agreed equal level in terms of this category of launcher-aircraft in Europe on the NATO side and on the USSR side.

In seeking to move the talks forward, the Soviet Union confirmed, on the eve of their second round, its readiness, in the event of agreement on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe and the entry into force of such an agreement, to suspend the deployment of SS-20 missiles in eastern regions of the USSR on the understanding that substantial changes in the strategic situation in the Asian region would not occur. The USSR's readiness for an even more radical solution, totally ridding Europe of both medium-range, and also tactical nuclear weapons, was also confirmed.

It is now becoming increasingly obvious that the tactic of the U.S. side in this aspect of the talks is subordinated to only one thing, gaining the necessary time to complete the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. Only this can explain its refusal to enter into a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe and its attempts to drag into the light of day its old, one-sided proposals; that is, the "zero" and "interim" options which demonstrated, many years ago now, their total unsuitability for reaching a mutual acceptable solution.

The U.S. approach is permeated from start to finish by a gamble on acquiring one-sided advantages. This also finds expression in the reluctance to include the nuclear armaments of Britain and France without which there cannot even be talk of any sort of balance of forces in the area of medium-range nuclear means in Europe. The U.S. side would like, essentially, all of its medium-range aviation in the European zone, including carrier-based aircraft, to remain outside the scope of the limitations.

Contrary to the letter and spirit of the SALT II treaty, the U.S. side is seeking to legitimatize the deployment of its medium-range missiles in Europe and it also lays claim to some sort of exclusive "right" on the part of the United States to deploy such missiles in other regions of the world from where they could reach targets in the USSR's territory. In other words, it is seeking not a lowering of the level of nuclear confrontation, but the legalization of channels for bypassing a possible accord; to the benefit of NATO and to the detriment of the USSR and its allies.

Having become ossified in this totally unconstructive approach, the U.S. side has literally not taken a single step in a positive direction, clearly demonstrating that it is deeply indifferent to questions of nuclear security in Europe, and also that it is not seeking a reduction of medium-range means in this region.

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From all this it can be seen that the U.S. side has done absolutely nothing in any direction to ensure that headway could be made at the talks. While the Soviet side has

made specific proposals and developed its position in a businesslike spirit, the Ú.S. side, without proposing anything constructive, has engaged only in creating obstacles in the path of serious work in Geneva. Washington's line on all salients of the talks is leading not to the curtailment but to the incitment of the arms race.

U.S. actions beyond the framework of the talks are also directed toward the arms race. While the Soviet Union is displaying restraint in developing its armaments, the United States is working flat out to create offensive space armaments and a large-scale ABM system with elements of space basing and is leading matters toward the undermining of the ABM treaty. Programs are being implemented for building up strategic armaments and creating ever new and increasingly dangerous forms and types of these armaments. Scorning the interest of the European peoples, the United States is continuing to expand the root of the nuclear threat in Europe in the form of its new medium-range first-strike missiles deployed in contravention of the SALT II treaty.

The United States already has to its credit a whole series of arms limitation and reduction talks which have been broken off or blocked and treaties and agreements in this field which have not been ratified. This circumstance cannot fail to make us think about where the United States is leading matters this time. The natural question arises: Doew Washington finally intend to embark in earnest on the fulfillment of the January accord, or does it want to maintain only a semblance of talks while having absolutely no need for positive results?

If that is the case, the U.S. Administration is taking on a grave responsibility. As M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed, "if our partners at the Geneva talks continue their line toward delaying tactics at the delegations' sessions, avoiding a solution to the questions for which they have gathered and using the time to force through their own military programs, in space, on earth, and at sea, then, of course, we will have to reassess the whole situation."

Of course, the United States' plans for achieving strategic superiority over the socialist countries and dictating its will to them are destined not to be realized. The Soviet Union and its allies will not allow it. But the problems now facing mankind cannot be resolved on the paths of the arms race.

We must not forget that in Geneva questions are being discussed on whose solutions the fate of the world literally depends. Turning them into objects of political gamesmanship and trying to subordinate their examination to selfish, egotistical considerations is intolerable. The peoples' interests require something else: joint measures aimed at the immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, a radical reduction of these arms, and the prevention of space's involvement in the arms race and its transformation into an area of military rivalry.

The Soviet side is ready, and it confirms this by its specific actions at the talks and outside them, to agree on such measures. But to reach an accord it is essential that the U.S. side make fundamental amendments to its position and bring it into line with the goals and tasks set forth in the 8 January 1985 joint Soviet-U.S. statement. The future of the Geneva talks depends on it.

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS: U.S. STAND OBSTRUCTS PROGRESS

LD261738 Moscow TASS in English 1723 GMT 26 Jul 85

[Text] Moscow July 26 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Washington is seeking to convince its NATO allies that the undermining of the process of restricting and limiting armaments as a result of the implementation of the American "star wars" programme and the deployment by the United States of a large-scale antimissile defence will, allegedly, enhance the chances for stronger peace and stability.

In a speech at a Washington conference of leaders of right-wing political parties, U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger, highly praising the "benefits" of Ronald Reagan's "Strategic Defence Initiative," proclaimed that the best way to maintain peace is through military might.

During its four and a half years in power, the Reagan administration demonstrated irresponsible disregard for U.S. treaty commitments and sought to convince world public opinion that the only reliable path towards a reduction in arms lies through their buildup by the NATO countries. This absurd propaganda thesis underlied all "peace initiatives" advanced by Washington.

Thus, Reagan's sham zero option provided, from the one hand, for the elimination of all Soviet medium-range missiles on the entire territory of the USSR and, on the other hand, for the preservation of the existing nuclear missile systems of NATO in Europe, giving full freedom to Britain and France in their further buildup.

The implementation of this proposal would ensure the North Atlantic alliance a large military advantage over socialist countries in medium-range systems.

The American side rejected the offer of an agreement under which the Soviet Union would leave in Europe the same number of medium-range missiles as Britain and France combined, and of reaching complete equality between the sides in the number of nuclear warheads and medium-range carrier-aircraft.

According to the American proposals on strategic armaments, the Soviet Union is to conduct an expensive restructuring of the nuclear shield of the socialist countries by eliminating a considerable part of its land-based modern ICBM's.

The American side, at that, would limit itself to cosmetic reductions of its obsolete strategic ballistic missiles and receive the right to increase the number of cruise

missiles on its long-range bombers to 8,000. The United States would thus gain a criple superiority by the number of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles.

Washington refused to accept the Soviet proposals for cutting the number of strategic carriers of both sides to 1,800 units, that is by 25 per cent, lowering down to equal levels the overall number of nuclear warheads on them.

At present, the United States, which undertook in the joint Soviet-American statement of January 8, 1985, to work for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, insists at the Geneva talks on its right to launch a large-scale space-based defence system and other space strike weapons.

In this field, Washington is going to follow its usual course -- that of building up weapons of mass destruction, while posing as peace-keeper. Washington's plans to spread the arms race into outer space are the greatest threat to peace on earth.

The world is at a dangerous turn. Normalization of the world situation now depends on whether Washington will want to correct its obstructionist stand and fulfill the tasks formulated in the January 8 joint Soviet-American statement.

The Soviet Union is prepared to do its utmost to achieve mutually acceptable agreements on preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on earth.

cso: 5200/1338

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

PRAVDA HITS KAMPELMAN REMARKS ON SDI, STRATEGIC ARMS

PM250940 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jul 85 First Edition p 5

[Tomas Kolesnichenko "Commentator's Column": "Double-Dealing"]

[Text] Does the United States intend to continue to build up production of nuclear arms? This question is by no means a rhetorical one. After all, if one is to believe the administration's official statements, all Washington's schemes are aimed at limiting and reducing "offensive" nuclear weapons. Recently, it has been precisely on this "philosophical basis," as Kampelman, leader of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks, put it, that the "star wars" theory has been built — a theory which, as if to be derisive, is called "Strategic Defense Initiative."

However, as is well known, Washington's peace-loving rhetoric is far removed from its real deeds. And one can even trace the workings of this hypocritical policy in specific cases. For instance, several months ago the president created without undue fuss some kind of special commission for monitoring the implementation of nuclear arms programs. It was given a "nonpartisan" objectivity by being comprised of Republicans and Democrats. But it is probably easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a supporter of nuclear disarmament to sit on the commission. The commission's very makeup determined its conclusions beforehand. And the other day, the commission presented President Reagan a report which "justified the need" to increase the rate of production of nuclear weapons and to seek more effective ways of so doing.

It is necessary to give the commission its due -- it delved meticulously into the Pentagon's "internal reserves" with a view to making the production of nuclear weapons more "profitable." The compilers of the report also call for an "improvement in coordination" and a "strengthening of ties" between the Pentagon and the Department of Energy, which, as is well known, controls nuclear warheads. In this connection specific administrative and managerial reforms are being proposed.

In short, the report is constructed in such a way as to make it seem that Washington does not have the other alternative of reducing nuclear arms and that all the discussion on this topic was just intended for the public and for calming public opinion.

It is a typical example of double-dealing. While Kampelman "philosophizes" about reducing nuclear arsenals, the commission report is being sent to the Pentagon and the Department of Energy. After "studying" the document, these two departments will start, as has been officially stated, to "work with Congress" on implementing the report's recommendations. And there can be no doubt that Congress will deem the commission's opinion "objective."

Another question arises: Just how does all this fit in with the White House's sworn promise to sharply reduce nuclear arsenals? It does not fit in at all. That is the very essence of "double-dealing." Saying one thing and doing another.

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

MOSCOW WEEKLY RADIO SHOW DISCUSSES GENEVA TALKS

LD282039 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 28 Jul 85

["International Observers Roundtable" program, with TASS political observer Yuriy Kornilov, and NOVOSTI political observer Spartak Beglov, presented by commentator Nikolay Agayants (not further identified)—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Agayants] It is probably appropriate to say here, Spartak Ivanovich, that we should today look through the prism of the Helsinki accords at the second round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons, which has ended in Geneva. The Soviet Union went there with the firm intention of conducting a constructive dialogue on preventing the militarization of near-earth space, on a radical reduction of strategic nuclear weaponry and medium-range missiles. Well, a lot has already been said about the constructive, peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union directed at making the talks successful.

Our side proposed that for the entire duration of these Geneva talks the USSR and U.S. should introduce a moratorium on the creation, including research work, testing, and deploying of space strike weapons. At the same time, we proposed a halt to the numerical buildup of strategic nuclear weapons, the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles in Western Europe by the U.S., and correspondingly the response on the part of the Soviet Union. But the American side, also at the second round of the Geneva talks, showed an openly obstructionist approach. It blocked the achievement of any progress.

[Beglov] It seems to me that here again we can draw an analogy between the European process, in other words between the fate of the Helsinki accords, and what is now happening in Geneva at the bilateral talks between the USSR and U.S. on questions of space and nuclear weapons. If we address the main question: Why is it that suddenly -despite the joint accord which was reached on 7-8 January of this year on the formula of the talks, the only formula which will lead to results -- why is it that, despite this, the results of the first rounds were still so unsatisfactory? The answer is the same which emerges from the experience of Helsinki. It is a question of the attitude of the United States to the spirit and letter of accords. After all, take Helsinki: In U.S. policy of the past decade the Helsinki Final Act was recalled only if it was necessary to make use of some point interpreted by the U.S. in its own way in order to hinder some talks, or in order simply to embark on the latest confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. It is the same thing in Geneva. It turns out that the United States has sort of forgotten that in the mutual accord of 7-8 January of this year there was recorded an unconditional linkage between not allowing the arms race in space and halting it on earth.

The U.S. ruling circles and the present administration consider that the main mandate they received from the military-industrial complex is aimed at finding any way of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union, and, seeing the increasing hopelessness of attaining such superiority on earth, it is striving to provide itself with that superiority by roundabout ways — in other words, by going into space and taking aim at our earth and the interests of our security from orbit. And here, if we are talking of why many negative phenomena and violations have occurred, why it has not proved possible to achieve some of the tasks set, including perhaps the main aims which were set in the sphere of security in Europe, cooperation in Europe, then I think that the reason lies in the fact that some states went to Helsinki at that time with the firm conviction that it was better to cooperate than to confront; while others, maybe the minority, but, alas, the leading minority in the West, including the ruling circles of the United States, went there not at all convinced that it was better to cooperate than to confront. There was a clash not only of specific political courses, but also the essence, the nature of the differing policies.

It is known that the Soviet Union has included the principles of the Final Act in its Constitution adopted in 1977. This fact speaks for itself. This is the essence and nature of a policy which makes our country consistent in implementing the principles of the Final Act. Unfortunately, things are not at all like that with the course of the United States. Everything that happened subsequently only confirms that where states succeeded in uniting on a platform of cooperation — I emphasize cooperation is the main principle of the Final Act — a fair amount was achieved that is good for detente. Wherever there was opposition to the policy of cooperation by nonrecognition of socialism, there was a new growth of tension. Because of that, there a blow was struck at overall security; not only the security of the USSR and the socialist countries, but also that of the West Europeans, who were prisoners of the nuclear strategy, tools of American nuclear blackmail. Now that the 10th anniversary is being celebrated, this account will unavoidably be laid at the doorstep of American policy.

[Agayants] Spartak Ivanovich, restructuring relations in the continent in the spirit of good-neighborliness and cooperation, in the spirit of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems, has proved to be considerably more complicated and contradictory in practice than was depicted 10 years ago in the days of the Helsinki conference. And if we dismiss the state of a certain euphoria that typified the first period following the signing of the Final Act, and soberly analyze the entire progress of subsequent events, in my view it should be said that a brake was set by the arms race unleashed by Washington and it is continuing to affect the general European process. The fact is that the United States is dragging its NATO allies into its dangerous militarist plans. As a result, there has been a sharp exacerbation of the situation in the world, a growth in the threat of a nuclear conflict; in relations between states, areas of mistrust and suspicion and complications have again arisen. And still, despite all the outlay and difficulties, on the whole it evidently can be said that the results of the past decade have been positive for Europe.

[Agayants] This week in the press center of the USSR Foreign Ministry in Moscow there was a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists. You took a direct part, Yuriy Emmanuilovich, in that press conference. Could you tell us in detail what questions were discussed there?

[Kornilov] At the press conference you mentioned, those participating -- numerous representatives of both the Soviet and foreign press -- were presented with a brochure entitled "Star Wars" the Illusions and the Dangers" which shows the true aims of the

"star wars" plans that are being drawn up in the United States. It reveals the essence of the approach by the Soviet Union and the United States to the problem of how space should be used, and contains an assessment of the ruinous consequences for the peoples of the world of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" put forward by the U.S. President, the realization of which is being implemented against the backdrop of a further buildup in U.S. strategic offensive weapons. The brochure also sets out the Soviet program of measures that should be taken to prevent an arms race in space and to end it on earth. What point would I highlight? What is the main idea running through this publication? It stresses that the world is currently at a dangerous turn, that the plans for the militarization of space that are being drawn up in Washington are threatening still further the security of peoples, and that they are creating a critical situation in international relations. If it does not prove possible to prevent the implementation of those plans, the arms race will evolve, as the brochure stresses, into a qualitatively new phase; uncontrollable processes will arise in the weapons field, and the risk of nuclear war breaking out will increase sharply. In other words, international developments have reached a point where the question arises as to where we go from here. Is it not time for those figures who determine state policy to stop, think, and prevent decisions from being taken which would push the world toward a nuclear catastrophe? Common sense suggests that the only way out is to freeze the nuclear arsenals of the sides and halt the preparations to create weapons to be stationed in space, and on that basis to go over without delay to reducing arms stockpiles. That is precisely the position of our country.

cso: 5200/1338

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET GENERAL ON SDI, NEW STRATEGIC ARMS, EUROMISSILES

DW231029 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 22 Jul 85 p 2

[Report on interview with USSR Lieutenant General Konstantin Mikhaylov, deputy chief of the Organizational Department of the General Staff, by correspondent Anton-Andreas Guha; date and place not given]

[Text] No matter what your views are of oviet armament and security policy, it was evident in this interview that the Kremlin leadership has an "honest fear" of being forced by SDI into a new arms race with incalculable military and political consequences. Lieutenant General Mikhaylov recognizes a basic pattern in this connection: "The United States has always been striving for military superiority, and it has always been the first to build new weapons that have also changed strategy. This time, it wants to develop offensive options with the assistance of its allies."

As in the past, the Soviet Union will not allow the United States to achieve superiority, the general says, stressing that "if SDI works, the United States could do what it wanted without punishment." Even though SDI would not be 100 percent effective, the USSR would nevertheless have to take countermeasures, the general says, adding that "there are many countermeasures" possible. The USSR would not copy SDI, but as one countermeasure, it would increase the number of intercontinental missiles. "Even if SDI were to be 95 percent effective, the United States would not have gained anything. The United States could be destroyed by 5 percent of Soviet nuclear weapons," Mikhaylov says. Therefore, he adds, SDI would not provide any security at all.

The continuation of this project, he notes, would violate all existing agreements between the world powers and make future ones impossible. The strengthened nuclear armament of the United States -- Mikhaylov mentions new submarine "Trident II" missiles, the B-l bomber, the "invisible" Stealth aircraft that cannot be detected by radar, and the MX missile (he considers the reduced number of 50 units to be "temporary") -- is viewed by the general as part of the concept of increasing offensive capacities while simultaneously creating a protective shield. He believes there have been three phases in U.S. security policy -- deterrence, the wish to survive a nuclear war, and now the aim to win a war. In this respect, Mikhaylov is in good company. Renowned Western critics, not least of all such U.S. politicians as Edward Kennedy or Gary Hart, view matters similarly.

Almost with regret, the Soviet general points to the risk the European allies of the United States are running in connection with the increased arms race between the two superpowers. This is a ticklish point, he says, "because the Soviet Union does not want to interfere in NATO," but it is clear to Moscow that Washington intends to shift

the risk to the allies under the motto "The worse it is for Europe, the better things are for the United States." The FRG in particular has been a "powder keg" since even before the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. It is thus a target for a Soviet counterstrike, he says.

Counterstrike? Does not the planning of Vasiliy Danilovich Sokolovskiy, the "grand-father" of Soviet nuclear strategy, envisage an immediate nuclear offensive if, based on a political assessment, war is considered to be inevitable? Is the Sokolovskiy strategy not a forerunner of the U.S. "Air-Land Battle" doctrine?

Lt Gen Mikhaylov disputes that this strategy was ever valid. Sokolovskiy's main idea was to prevent a nuclear war, he says. Soviet strategy is defensive, and the unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances is irrefutable.

The USSR would not use nuclear weapons even if it would be militarily advantageous, such as to destroy U.S. bases in West Europe. However, naturally "an attack could also be the best defense," he says, adding that offensive ability is necessary for defense. "Defensive operations could take the form of an offense," but this military truism ends when nuclear weapons are involved. We will not be the first to use them, Mikhaylov states.

Is the USSR not superior to NATO in conventional weapons?

Mikhaylov denies that as well. There is a balance, he says, citing the renowned international Institute for Strategic Studies in London as his chief witness. This institute has stated that no side, not even the Warsaw Pact, could launch a conventional offensive without an incalculable risk. According to Mikhaylov, this opinion is shared by the U.S. General Staff and such FRG experts as Andreas von Buelow and retired General Christian Krause.

The general applies dialectic methods to answer the question of why the Warsaw Pact, in contrast to the commitments made in Helsinki, extend so few invitations to Western military representatives to attend Eastern maneuvers. Mikhaylov, who was deeply involved on the Soviet side in connection with the Helsinki agreements, says that invitations can be made only "as a sign of good will." Invitations "can be extended, but do not have to be," he adds.

Are not such agreements intended to improve the political climate?

Certainly Mikhaylov says, but an announcement does not automatically mean an invitation. Moreover, we "have made certain observations in connection with such invitations." The USSR presented far-reaching proposals in Stockholm: Invitations should be extended whenever 20,000 troops will participate in maneuvers and 30 days before the maneuvers take place (instead of 20 days as now). The USSR extends invitations to those maneuvers "that are important for NATO to see if they are cause for fear or concern," he concludes.

cso: 5200/1338

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET OFFICIALS, SCHOLARS TAKE 'OPTIMISTIC' VIEW OF TALKS

PM191141 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 16 Jul 85 p 17

[Report by Wiktor Martinsen: "Among the Optimists in Moscow"]

[Text] If you talk to people in the Soviet Union who deal with foreign and security policy at the Soviet Foreign Ministry or in research institutes, you are struck by the optimism expressed about the disarmament negotiations and the possibility of achieving constructive results. Sergey Komissarov, chief of the Scandinavian department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry [name and title as published], had the following to say about the possibility of success in the negotiations:

"There is a simple method of achieving results -- you only need to agree on the correct steps."

He takes the view that Gromyko and Shultz took just such a step when they succeeded in reaching agreement on a joint statement.

At first glance it looks as if the new round of talks could easily reach dead-lock on the problems surrounding star wars research, verification, and considerations of prestige.

On the Soviet side the events surrounding the preparations are assessed differently. The view in the Soviet Foreign Ministry is that the approach which the Americans brought with them to the preparatory talks was a recipe for continued U.S. rearmament. The Reagan administration's proposal of two parallel lines of negotiation — one on offensive systems and one on defensive systems, including the star wars program — could not prevent a new arms races along new paths, it is said in the foreign ministry.

However, the present basis for negotiations has a greater chance of achieving a broader agreement, another foreign ministry representative, press department deputy chief Vladimir A. Morozov [name and title as published], said. "It is possible to imagine agreement being reached on a framework agreement which will ensure that research will not be carried out," he said. On the basis of such a framework agreement, verification is not thought particularly difficult.

Morozov pointed out that the development of such an advanced arms program does not end in the laboratory. Perhaps the most important part of the development program is the technical tests. Thousands of practical tests are needed before such a weapons system can be perfected. These technical tests could easily be discovered with the surveillance equipment the two superpowers possess. "If it is possible to arrive at a framework agreement banning ABM weapons, there are no major problems in monitoring the part of the development program which involves technical tests: the Americans boast that they can pick up a glowing cigarette on the ground, anywhere at all, with their surveillance systems," Morozov said.

You are struck by the same positive view of the negotiations' chances when you talk to researchers who have superpower relations as their field. The World Economics and International Relations Institute is an institute under the Soviet Academy of Sciences with thousands of researchers and with specialist departments such as U.S.-USSR relations, international capitalism, and the Scandinavian countries and conditions there.

One of the institute's researchers, Konstantin Voranov, told me the story of the two frogs who each fell into buckets of cream, when he wanted to illustrate attitudes to the current negotiations. The one frog gave up quite quickly and drowned. The other frog was optimistic and tried endlessly to jump over the side. In the end he agitated the cream so much that it turned to butter and he was able to get out over the side.

Voranov saw no obvious danger of the talks' being blocked and he too, like the Foreign Ministry spokesmen, claimed that the problems of verification in connection with the star wars program can be overcome given the will.

Konstantin Voranov also stressed the importance of the small nations' active involvement in the politics of disarmament. He referred among other things to the role of smaller nations have played in connect with the U.S. research program and the attempts to involve Europe in the development of the new space weapons.

"Europe has an interest of its own in preserving space," he said. He said that the right thing to do would be for Europe to dissociate itself completely from the U.S. research and development program.

"Europe's interests would be best served by a research strategy of its own and by Europe's maintaining its own control over the values -- both industrial and technological -- that are built into such a research project."

Mitterrand's Eureka project must be much more valuable and interesting for Europe than the U.S. research project, and he pointed out that the French Hermes project measures up well alongside the U.S. research project evaluated in terms of industrial consequences. The commercial value of the results have been estimated at several billion dollars, he said, and there are already 35-37 orders in connection with satellite launchings under the Hermes project. Certain proof of the possibilities contained in independent European research, Voranov said.

U.S-USSR GENEVA TALKS

U.S. STANCE AT SECOND ROUND OF GENEVA TALKS ASSAILED BY GDR

East Berlin ADN INTERNATIONAL SERVICE in German 1951 GMT 26 Jul 85 LD

[By Joachim Sonnenberg]

[Text] Geneva, 26 Jul (ADN) -- Following the end of the second round of negotiations between the USSR and United States, discussions continue unabated among diplomatic observers and journalists here in Geneva. The statements made on the present discussions are being attentively studied in the capitals of the two great powers.

For most observers it is clear that an agreement on the renunciation of any kind of space armament remains the key question because otherwise space would become a source of deadly dangers for the whole planet and human civilization.

Of course it is known here that the Soviet position is based on the concept that under no circumstances must weapons be sent into space and no preparations whatsoever with this in mind, should be made. Instead, the renunciation of such intentions would prevent a new stage of the arms race. Mikhail Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, has pointed this out repeatedly of late. The objective, which corresponds to the interests of all the peoples equally, is that prevention of the militarization of space and arms limitation on earth are most closely linked. The latest steps toward disarmament on earth will be wasted unless the United States' "star wars" plans are stopped. The complexity of the negotiations in all three areas —space weapons, strategic offensive weapons, and medium—range weapons — corresponds in particular to the objectives laid down for Geneva between the United States and USSR.

More and more observers, on the basis of information available to them here in Geneva, have reached the conviction that the United States' refusal to agree to arrangements on the prevention of the arms race in space, in the spirit of the Soviet-American agreement of 8 January this year, is the main reason that progress has also not been made in the second round of megotiations.

Whatever the American side may say in order to mislead the public on the objectives of the so-called Strategic Defense Iniitative (SDI), the realization of this project would mean that in space an extremely dangerous category of new weapons would appear. The USSR's view is that mankind would then go beyond the limit in the arms race, where there would probably be no turning back. The development of space offensive weapons would mean the wrecking of the treaty on missile defense systems (ABM) on which the whole process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons is based, and also the wrecking of this very process. In any case a substantial destabilization of the situation would come about.

The American view that its space project is to safeguard scientific, technological, and economic progress is finding fewer and fewer advocates. And it is indeed anything but a suitable procedure for boosting scientific and technological progress for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the USSR has been urging a ban on the whole category of space offensive weapons and an immediate moratorium on this research, development, testing, and deployment. It has emphasized that this would correspond to the interests of the USSR and the United States, and the interests and hopes of all states and peoples in the world, and that, on the contrary, realization of the SDI program would finally wreck the existing Soviet-American agreements on the preservation of strategic stability. This program undoubtedly aims at achieving military superiority with the help of space.

As recently as Thursday the Soviet side made clear once again at a press conference that it is striving in Geneva for honest agreements but that it will have no other choice but the adoption of countermeasures to reestablish equilibrium should the United States begin to militarize space and thus upset the military-strategic equilibrium.

In these considerations, the total complex of the military balance of power again and again plays an essential role in the nuclear weapon systems being discussed in Geneva. As far as strategic offensive weapons are concerned, it has become increasingly clear that the United States seeks to implement by every means its program concerning the further strengthening of its nuclear first-strike potential, while at the same time seeking to have the USSR weaken its defense capability in this area. Likewise, the U.S. representatives during the second round of negotiations on nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe, as everybody here meanwhile knows, have rejected all Soviet proposals that aime to reduce the potentials of the two sides. Not even a moratorium on the further deployment of such missiles has been accepted. And this despite the fact that concerning the number of medium-range missiles in Europe, there exists an approximate balance between NATO and the USSR.

In this respect, too, the arguments and facts advanced by the USSR have gained increasing credibility with the public. From them it has emerged that the Soviet proposal for the introduction of a moratorium for medium-range missiles in Europe is a fair and just proposal that in no way, as claimed by the U.S. side, aims to gain any unilateral advantages.

In contrast, with the deployment of new American medium-range missiles in Europe an attempt is being made to destroy the approximate balance of power that exists here.

Furthermore, the Soviet side has pointed out repeatedly that the American medium-range missiles in Europe can reach the territory of the USSR, and that consequently they must be considered a supplement to the U.S. strategic arsenal. Their deployment, while ignoring the SALT II agreement, consequently undermines the balance of power concerning strategic offensive weapons.

All the information that has become known about the second round of negotiations shows that the USSR in all the three areas of negotiations — space weapons, strategic offensive weapons, and nuclear medium-range weapons — has been searching intensively for ways of approximating the positions, for ways of working out mutually acceptable solutions. Numerous commentators in Geneva watching these important negotiations have agreed that for the first time in the postwar period, a fundamental reduction in the nuclear threat to the continent could be achieved if there were an agreement within the spirit of this initiative.

SOVIET WEEKLY ASSAILS JAPANESE INTEREST IN SDI

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 26, Jun 85 pp 12-13

[Article by Y. Tavrovsky: "'Land of the Rising Sun' and 'Star Wars'"]
[Text]

After a tour of the Uchinoura Space Research Centre on the island of Kyushu we walked down to the rocky sea shore where the launching pads of the Japanese Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science were situated. On the way down Dr Minoru Oda, director of the centre, told us correspondents about the EXOS-C satellite which was to be launched the next day, the forthcoming studies of the density of ozone in the upper atmosphere, "black holes" and novas. Somebody asked him whether Japanese scientists would help develop the permanently operating manned space station the U.S. President had mentioned, "That isn't an easy question at all. I shall try to answer it a little later," Dr Oda replied politely.

We learned the answer at the foot of a multistorey launcher with a silvery three-stage rocket "glued" to it.

"This is the N-2 rocket, Dr Oda explained. "It is a faithful reflection of the present condition of Japan's space technology. It was built under U.S. licence in Japan. Some of the components are 'black boxes' delivered from overseas and Japanese specialists are forbidden to study their design. But nevertheless this rocket is an achievement, because in the past rockets consisted practically solely of components made in the U.S.A. The situation with satellites is a little better. The

one we are orbiting tomorrow is 98 per cent Japanese. It should be mentioned that the Tanegashima launching site, run by the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) is still orbiting communications and weather satellites that have either been purchased from the U.S.A. in toto or are largely made up of imported units and assemblies.

"This is due to the fact that both the scientific and applied Japanese space programmes have only recently been started. Under U.S. occupation all work on rocketry was banned. The first rocket with a weight of 700 grammes and a length of 23 centimetres—was launched only in 1955. That was known as the 'pencil' rocket. The first Japanese satellite was put in orbit as late as 1970. The launching of 'working' vehicles, first the Himawari weather satellites and later the Yuri communications satellites, was begun on a regular basis in 1977. They were orbited from U.S. grounds and only 15 per cent of their equipment was Japanese-made. The year 1981 witnessed the birth of second-generation Japanese satellites which, 30 to 60 per cent Japanese-made, were launched from Japanese territory. It is worth noting that the trouble the Yuri-2a and the Himawari-2 satellites developed shortly after being orbited in 1984 was due precisely to the imported units. Our desire to become completely

independent both in rocketry and in the construction of satellites is easy to understand. The new space programme provides for the development by the early 1990s of an H-II Japanese rocket which would be capable of orbiting a two-ton payload, six times more than the present 'work horse'—the N-2—can cope with. And although a Japanese astronaut is to go up on board a U.S. Shuttle in 1988, we dream of using our own carrier-rockets for manual space flights.

"And now," Dr Oda said, "let's go back to the U.S. space station project. Like other Japanese researchers, I am eager to take part in it. We could learn a lot and also share our achievements. What is troubling us is the possibility of military applications of the station. If it is confirmed that the project has a 'military lining,' we will have to refuse to take part."

Dr. Oda's misgivings about the officially proclaimed "absolutely peaceful" nature of the space station are not unfounded. Commenting on the project, the Japan Times, a paper close to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, wrote: "The indications are that the U.S. station will serve more than peaceful purposes." The weekly Far Eastern Economic Review informed its readers that "NASA is maintaining an active liaison with the U.S. Air Force space command and the U.S. Navy space command to ensure that the space station's design is not incompatible with future possible military uses of the station." A group of leading Japanese scientists recently demanded that the government should guarantee them the right of non-participation in projects that contributed to the formation of a military-industrial-scientific complex in Japan. This demand also covered research in rocketry.

The answer to the question about Japan's participation in the development of the space station was, in effect, given at the end of last year when the government allocated 1.5 billion yen to work in pursuit of the project in 1985. On May 9 this year, an agreement was signed in Tokyo on the conditions and forms of Japanese participation at the initial stage of the project. It is assumed that similar documents will be signed as progress is made on the station,

which is due to be orbited in 1992-93. By then, Japanese outlays will have amounted to 300 billion yen, i.e., approximately one seventh of the total cost of the project. U.S. spokesmen have suggested that their Japanese colleagues should carry out 14 programmes in the development of the station. However, the Japanese scientists were not satisfied with the minor role offered to them and announced their intention of producing their own laboratory module.

The military-industrial concerns are eager to participate in the project. The Mitsubishi, Ishikawajima Harima, Toshiba and Mitsui companies have all set up special research centres. Without waiting for an official government decision, the Japanese military agencies started work, in September 1984, on secret "star war" programmes. The U.S.A. has made inquiries about anti-satellite homing systems, and Japanese specialists have been studying the performance of two types of laser weapons.

The Japanese companies not only hope to snatch a tasty morsel in the form of contracts from the government-subsidized Space Agency. By cooperating with U.S. contractors, they also hope to "borrow" scientific and technological information in order to reduce the gap in space technology.

The hopes and calculations of Japanese firms and government agencies are, of course, no secret to their U.S. partner-competitors. Aviation Week and Space Technology has already commented on NASA's intention of taking "protective policy measures" against information leakage to Japan. However, in the matter of Japan's participation in the U.S. space programme the U.S.A. itself seems to be the more interested party.

There are several reasons behind this. Washington is eager in particular to shift part of the burden imposed by the arms race onto Japan and its other allies. Furthermore, though the Americans have been scornful of Japan's space programme, they have been compelled to admit that the Japanese lead in several narrow fields of electronics, robotics, laser technology, the manufacture of new materials and

miniaturization. No wonder Washington has put powerful pressure on Tokyo to create a mechanism for the transfer of new Japanese technical developments to the U.S.A. This mechanism is the Joint Military Technology Commission. The U.S.A. is very interested in Japan's gallium-arsenide semiconductors, optical fibres and artificial intelligence (fifth-generation computers).

In an attempt to draw Tokyo the crazy "star wars" scheme Washington has already promised Japan "protection" by means of the planned space weapon system. Just as in the case of the "nuclear umbrella" provided under the terms of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, the new level of "protection" may turn out to be an even greater threat to Japan's national security, a further infringement of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

But the men in Tokyo do not think so.

During the meeting of the Seven in Bonn early in May Ronald Reagan met Yasuhiro Nakasone, the Japanese Premier, and urged Tokyo to join the "star wars" scheme. The local press pointed out that Nakasone in fact supported the U.S. President's call.

Are the Japanese ruling circles aware of what many Japanese have long realized, namely that the militarization of space would accelerate the arms race and, far from decreasing the threat to the whole of mankind, would actually increase it?

CSO: 1812/300

USSR: DANGERS OF U.S. MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS STRESSED

Riga KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII in Russian No 6, Jun 85 pp 46-56

[Article by V. Israelyan, doctor of historical sciences, and N. Neyland: "Space Should Serve the Peace"]

[Text] The Washington administration's plans to extend the arms race to space generate alarm in all the peaceloving public. The fact is that militarization of outer space will sharply increase the danger of nuclear war if a reliable barrier is not erected in its path. It is a question not only of the fate of modern civilization, but also of the preservation of man as a biological species.

The Soviet Union is a resolute enemy of competition in any arms race, including space arms. Having opened the space era in 1957 by launching the world's first artificial satellite, the USSR introduced a proposal to the United Nations as early as 1958 which provided for prohibiting the use of outer space for military purposes.

It is noteworthy that one of the first clashes of opposing trends, militaristic and peaceful, in the study of space occurred at the very beginning of our century. A message from America about tests of a combat rocket allegedly conducted there appeared 80 years ago in the Russian newspaper ILLYUSTRIROVANNYYE BIRZHEVYYE VEDOMOSTI. On hearing that Tsiolkovskiy in Russia had developed the theory of a gigantic rocket which would take people up and deliver them to celestial bodies, a journalist wrote figuratively that it already had been tested in America and had thrown "projectiles filled with bullets to great distances." This was a typical canard, but it led the father of future cosmonautics to sad reflection. "I never worked to perfect methods of warfare," he wrote angrily to the newspaper. "I had peaceful, lofty goals: to conquer the universe for the good of mankind." Tsiolkovskiy called adherents of the opposite trend universal sharks, borrowing this scathing expression from the American inventor Edison.

What would Tsiolkovskiy and Edison say had they lived to see the very dangerous space missile exercises of the present U.S. administration, whose advisers demand "driving the enemy into a technological dead-end"? Over a quarter-century has passed since the day the era of peaceful development of space began. In these years man's creative genius and labor have placed thousands of satellites into near-Earth orbits, they have reached the Moon, and have sent automatic laboratories to far-off planets. More than 140 Earth emissaries have been in space. Our countryman Yuriy Gagarin was the first among them. His flight on 12 April 1961 marked mankind's greatest victory over the forces of nature. Entire crews began to set off on space trips over Gagarin's road and man dared to emerge from the flying craft into open space.

Spacecraft initially were launched for experimental purposes, and then there was a turn to their broader use for practical earthly needs. Automatic satellites, sounding rockets, interplanetary laboratories, manned craft and orbital stations revealed to mankind much that was new about the Earth and the space around it.

With the help of space technology people learned a new way of solving problems of communications, navigation, geodesy and cartography, compiling long-range weather forecasts, monitoring the environment, studying natural resources and determining the coordinates of the crews of ships and aircraft in distress. The KOSPAS-SARSAT system for searching for vessels and aircraft in distress can serve as an example of successful international collaboration in the development of space for the welfare of mankind. Developed through the joint efforts of the USSR, United States, Canada and France, it already has helped save over 250 citizens of different countries.

Space technology helped astronomers "see" the reverse side of the Moon and obtain portraits of Venus and Mars, collect very interesting data on the Sun, and make a journey to Jupiter and Saturn.

Another example of the productive cooperation of various states in the peace-ful development of space was the December 1984 launch of a space station from the Soviet Union in the direction of Venus and Halley's Comet. Austria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the FRG and Czechoslovakia are participating with France and the Soviet Union in this bold project, known by the name "Vega." The joint Soviet-American flight of the Soyuz and Apollo craft also should be viewed in terms of such cooperation.

The prophetic words of our great countryman K. E. Tsiolkovskiy, who predicted that space would present mankind with "mountains of bread and a huge amount of power," are beginning to come true. This wise and perspicacious person expressed one other valuable thought: "Mankind is acquiring a universal ocean, seemingly given it intentionally in order to join people in a single whole, in a single family..."

Like the development of space technology itself, the development of space, penetration into its depths and use of its unique features represent a completely new and very specific sphere of human endeavor. On the one hand, colossal opportunities for progress open up for makind and, on the other hand, such activity may lead the world to incalculable misfortunes. It is all a matter of how these achievements will be used, since there is no fundamental

difference between rockets carrying equipment into space for peaceful scientific research and rockets used for military purposes.

A number of treaties and agreements was concluded at the initiative of the Soviet Union and other socialist states which on the whole established a rather good basis for assuring the peaceful development of outer space. The international Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was concluded in 1963. This was a first but very important step in the campaign of mankind's peaceloving forces for a clean space.

The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies was signed in 1967. It provides for the obligation not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

In 1972 the USSR and United States concluded the very important Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Systems. The parties pledged "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, airbased, space-based, or mobile land-based."

The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was concluded in 1977. This international agreement also encompasses methods of modifying near-Earth space for military purposes and the use of space for modifying the Earth's environment.

The pledges of states to assure the peaceful use of the Moon and other celestial bodies of the solar system are specified in an agreement signed in 1979.

But now the use of space exclusively for peaceful purposes does not suit everyone. People abroad deemed it necessary to take the path of developing space arms to achieve their hegemonic goals. The American side, for example, broke off talks on antisatellite systems which were held during 1977-1979. Plans for the militarization of space have assumed an especially ominous scope with the arrival of the present U.S. administration to power.

Considering the danger of the existing situation, which may turn into a disaster for all mankind, the United Nations Organization adopted a resolution in its General Assembly in 1984 calling on the Geneva Disarmament Conference to accelerate consideration of the question of preventing an arms race in space. A discussion of this point at this Conference's winter-spring session of 1985 showed that the overwhelming majority of the 40 countries party to this international forum expressed interest in preserving space as a sphere of mankind's peaceful endeavors. There was a widely recognized need for additional international legal measures in order to guard space against the spread of the arms race to it.

Washington's plans and programs aimed at using space for military strategic purposes and for disturbing the existing parity in the correlation of world forces caused serious concern for the overwhelming majority of conferees. The

Indian delegation, for example, criticized American arguments that space weapons allegedly will make nuclear offensive arms "ineffective" and "obsolete," stressing that in the best instance this was an attempt to pass off something desirable as reality, and in the worst instance, to strengthen a nuclear first strike potential.

Swedish representative M. B. (Teorin) gave the reminder from the Conference rostrum that the ABM Treaty of 1972 prohibits space-based ABM systems, but doesn't limit development of antisatellite kinds of arms. Calling for a ban on the development, testing and deployment of all space arms, she proposed that all states refrain from this until such an agreement was signed. In her opinion it was necessary to prohibit the use of antisatellites against the spacecraft of other states.

Sri Lanka representative Ambassador (Janapala) stressed that "the development of antisatellite weapons will not lead to a strengthening of stability, but more likely will be a source of mistrust." He cautioned that "this will dangerously increase the risk of war because of technical error or even because of a chance collision of satellites."

The People's Republic of China delegation called for concentrating efforts above all on prohibiting the research, testing, development, production, deployment and use of any kinds of space weapons including antisatellites and space-based ballistic missile defense, and eliminating the existing systems of such weapons.

Various public and scientific organizations also point out the mortal danger of an arms race in space. Suffice it to refer in this regard to the international congress held in July of last year in Göttingen (FRG) under the slogan "Realizing responsibility for the cause of peace, scientists and naturalists caution against the danger of a militarization of space." There were 2,500 scientists from various countries who took part in this representative forum. An international meeting held in the Papal Academy of Sciences in the Vatican in which prominent scientists participated from ten countries including the USSR and United States sounded the call in January 1985 "to prohibit the deployment and testing of all arms in outer space."

But Washington is still deaf to the voice of reason. Its present approach to a resolution of problems involving the use of outer space cannot be viewed in isolation from the general line of U.S. policy for breaking the existing balance between East and West in the strategic military area and achieving superiority. A direct gamble essentially is being made on breaking forward in the military sense through space, relying on the U.S. industrial-technological potential, in order then to dictate its will. "It is possible to keep the whole world in fear from space" was how Col J. Lousma, commander of the American Shuttle spacecraft, frankly summed up the purpose of Washington's plans.

A graphic illustration of this sort of calculation is the presidential directive of 4 July 1982, which determines the basic directions of U.S. activity in space. According to the directive, American space programs propose the

development of a "space defense" as one of their principal objectives. Further, "the United States will continue to develop the potential of antisatellite systems for the purpose of their operational deployment." And so the gamble is being made on a widescale ABM system (also including a space element) on the one hand, and on antisatellites on the other hand. In addition to plans for military use of the Shuttle spacecraft, these two programs concentrate within themselves the efforts of the U.S. military-industrial complex to extend the arms race to space.

Let's take the plan for developing a widescale ABM system, which the American president announced in his sadly familiar television speech of 23 March 1983 and which was confirmed by Presidential Directive No 119 signed on 6 January 1984. This project was called a "strategic defense initiative." It is a question of a program providing for the deployment of a multilayered ABM system in several tiers intended for "screening" U.S. territory. It is proposed to develop a system which would be capable of engaging the other side's ballistic missiles on the final leg of the trajectory during their entry into the atmosphere, during the flight through space, and during the missile's boost when it has just begun movement toward the target.

In the opinion of American specialists, one of the most promising directions is the use of lasers as well as of beam weapons, i.e., beams consisting of charged elementary particles. American designers also are thinking about deploying a system of very precise mirrors in space which could be used to transmit destructive beam energy from ground-based sources "to all corners of the world." The very work of implementing such a program has a provocative, destabilizing character regardless of its end results.

The U.S. course toward producing an antisatellite weapon also is just as dangerous for international peace. The deployment of such a weapon would lead to an abrupt destabilization of the situation and an increase in the threat of surprise attack, and it would undermine efforts to assure trust among nuclear-weapon states.

The destruction of satellites performing important functions of observation and communications would permit an attacking side to count on "blinding the enemy," catching him unawares, and weakening his capability of retaliation in case of nuclear aggression. An attack on a satellite thus would be an aggressive act, and an act which could be fully considered as preparation for a nuclear first strike.

Special antisatellite missiles launched from aboard high-altitude F-15 fighters presently are being developed within the framework of the ASAT program (the production of antisatellite weapons). The first tests of such a system were held in January 1984 and new tests are to be conducted in June of this year. A special danger of the U.S. antisatellite weapon is that it is conceived as a dual-purpose system, i.e., not only for the destruction of satellites, but also for tests of beam weapons intended for intercepting and destroying nuclear warheads. If one considers the U.S. capabilities for deploying air forces, it follows that the United States could deploy its antisatellite system in any part of the globe in the shortest possible time period

and it would be capable of organizing a coordinated attack at its discretion at any time.

The U.S. course toward militarization of space is reinforced by a number of organizational measures and by establishment of a special command and control structure.

A decision was made in November 1984 to establish the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Space Command. A space center is being built for controlling military actions in space and a military space port is being constructed for the reusable Shuttle craft, the operational program of which is in fact under Pentagon direction.

In the minds of those who have not given up plans for attaining military superiority, space weapons are to play the role of a key element of the potential for a first strike employing nuclear weapons.

The "star wars" program, intended for achieving military superiority through space, is a deadly scheme for mankind inasmuch as it concerns the practical development and deployment of a largescale ABM system over U.S. territory. Such a system clearly is intended for delivering a first strike while avoiding or substantially neutralizing retaliation.

That conclusion also is confirmed by the fact that the United States has rejected a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and its plans for deploying antimissile systems are accompanied by a build-up in strategic offensive arms.

The legitimate question arises: If this program really is aimed at making offensive nuclear weapons unnecessary, why is there an unprecedented build-up in the American strategic nuclear arsenal in parallel with this? This includes the production of the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, deployment of the Pershing II missiles in Europe, and construction of new Stealth bombers, Tomahawk cruise missiles and Trident II missiles for nuclear-powered submarines. U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger doesn't even deem it necessary to conceal that implementation of all these programs in the strategic arms area is aimed at a sharp increase in U.S. capabilities to deliver a nuclear first strike.

The following reasonable question also suggests itself: If Washington is placing emphasis on "defense," then why deploy nuclear first strike weapons near the borders of the USSR and its allies?

The dangerous nature of plans for militarization of space also is recognized in the United States itself, in Congress. For example, Congressman G. Brown warns that implementation of such plans will intensify the arms race since the Soviet Union will regard them as a program for developing a first strike weapon. The congressman called upon the administration to place a moratorium on tests of antisatellite weapons and do everything to prevent the militarization of space. D. Fascell, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, condemned plans for deploying an ABM system with space-based elements.

Congressman R. Castenmeier called for rejecting the "star wars" program and reaching an agreement on preventing an arms race in space.

This is understandable, for historical experience indicates that every time the United States has tried to assure itself of military superiority by development of the latest arms this generated retaliatory actions on the part of the USSR for the purpose of preserving the existing parity, and a new spiral of the arms race would begin.

If the militarization of space fails to be halted promptly, it will absorb enormous material and nonmaterial resources and will entail an unprecedented growth in military expenditures. According to American data, the "star wars" research program alone will swallow up \$26 billion during 1986-1989.

It is planned to spend \$1.4 billion in Fiscal Year 1985 for these purposes. Judging from specialists' estimates, the development of a multilayered ABM system with space-based components will cost \$1.5-2 trillion.

It is also impossible not to dwell on the international legal consequences of the U.S. course toward militarization of space. This is also especially necessary because a campaign has intensified in Washington of late for spreading concocted accusations of other states, including the USSR, for violating international obligations.

Washington would like to use talk about Soviet "violations" to hide the fact that the United States itself long ago set a course toward destabilizing the system of international agreements and undermining the 1972 permanent ABM Treaty. This concerns a very important document, which made it possible to conclude the 1972 Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, as well as the SALT II Treaty.

The introduction of an all-encompassing ABM system with space-based elements is possible only at the cost of eliminating the ABM Treaty. The unfolding of extensive scientific research and development [R&D] and the conduct of practical tests of individual system components are objectively leading to the undermining of this very important Soviet-American treaty. Pentagon representatives themselves are forced to admit this. U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger stated plainly on 12 September 1984: "At this stage . . . we are conducting research to determine whether or not a completely reliable system can be developed. If it can, we will have to go beyond the scope of the ABM Treaty." Or take Weinberger's television interview in which he admitted that he "never was an adherent of the ABM Treaty." General Abrahamson, director of the ABM program, also makes no attempt to conceal the Pentagon's true intentions. He stated on 17 December 1984: "When only part of the all-encompassing ABM system has been developed and is ready for use, the United States will have to agree with the USSR on a modification of the ABM Treaty since some of its provisions will diverge from the system's missions."

And the matter is not limited to statements alone. In direct contradiction with precise provisions of the 1972 Treaty, work is in full swing in the United States to develop mobile ABM radars and to use Minuteman missiles as

ABM missiles; multiple-warhead re-entry vehicles are being developed for the ABM missiles; and radars (Pave Paws) are being deployed for radar support to the ballistic missile defense of the greater part of U.S. territory.

The implementation of a program of a largescale ABM system with space-based elements inevitably will give rise to an uncontrolled arms race in all directions, especially since Washington entirely refuses to ratify another important document, the SALT II Treaty. It actually has been derailed. The fact is that peoples of the world hoped that its entry into force would open the way to achieve new effective agreements aimed at stopping the arms race and reducing the threat of war.

Washington has had no desire to reckon with the peoples' interests. Moreover, as it now has been learned, Washington only declared the intent "to refrain from actions" which would undermine the SALT II Treaty as a matter of form. In reality there was a different plan: to bypass the restrictions established under the treaty, to try to break the parity fixed in the treaty, and to secure military superiority.

Washington's genuine attitude toward the obligations stemming from the SALT II Treaty is indicated by the fact that the draft military budget for FY 1986, which the administration just submitted to Congress, contains plans for deploying strategic offensive arms which, if implemented, would signify U.S. departure far beyond the limits of restrictions on ballistic missiles established by the treaty.

Meanwhile, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the aforementioned international legal documents for strengthening peace and security, considering in particular that the 1972 ABM Treaty as well as the SALT I and SALT II treaties contain obligations not to impede "national technical means of verification." This means that in reality the satellites for photography, electronic satellites, early warning satellites as well as certain satellites for observing ocean areas are protected by those agreements against destruction and interference.

In order to develop an all-encompassing ABM system the United States is ready to derail other international agreements as well, among them the 1963 treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in three media, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

The true nature of plans for the militarization of space being developed in the United States is not subject to doubt—it has a clear—cut aggressive direction. This was pointed out by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev, speaking in Warsaw on 26 April: "Mankind is faced with the choice: will the unfavorable course of events be successfully corrected or will the danger of nuclear war increase? That danger is being intensified many times by U.S. military plans in space. No matter what their authors say or how they justify themselves, the essence of these plans is clear: to obtain the capability of delivering a nuclear first strike and delivering it with

impunity. Inasmuch as the United States and NATO categorically refused to follow the USSR's example and undertake not to be first to employ nuclear weapons, their intentions acquire an even more dangerous character.

"The development of weapons for the 'star wars' is just beginning, but it is already making the modern world feverish and leading to a destabilization of the entire system of international relations and to an even more acute political and military confrontation than at the present time."

The aggressive nature of the new American space doctrine also would be preserved if after establishing an ABM system the United States did not use its capabilities to launch missiles against the USSR and deliver a nuclear strike. The United States could use the very fact of possessing such a capability in the presence of a "space shield" to blackmail and bring pressure to bear on other countries, and above all on the Soviet Union.

It also should be borne in mind that the space weapons being designed in the United States can fully become a means for employing military force against those states which are incapable of developing appropriate means of countermeasures and protection.

It is impossible to be led astray by statements of the American administration that implementation of the "strategic defensive initiative" is limited to the scope of R&D and that this work allegedly does not bear for now any threat of the deployment of a comprehensive ABM system.

But who cannot see that the United States is spending billions of dollars on R&D not at all out of love for science and technical discoveries? Tests of components of the widescale ABM system which already are being conducted and planned by the Pentagon are directly intended for establishing those conditions where it would remain only to make the decision for practical deployment of appropriate means. They wish to bring the USSR face to face with the fact of the predetermined appearance of an all-encompassing ABM system in the United States in a short period of time. For this reason the reservations concerning "research" do not change the substance of the matter.

U.S. officials themselves also speak of the real danger of the American "strategic initiative" in space. Suffice it to turn, for example, to an interview published in the journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY with Lt Gen James Abrahamson, who has been given responsibility for implementing the "star wars" program. He declared in this interview that the work entrusted to him is advancing so quickly that the first tests of a space weapon can be conducted considerably earlier than planned, and in 1987 specifically. The general's revelations were repeated by Michael Burch, assistant U.S. secretary of defense (public affairs). He announced that beginning in 1987 it was planned to conduct experiments under the "star wars" program each year during two flights by reusable spacecraft. He clarified that during such experiments "the capabilities of detection, tracking and guidance to targets" in space were to be "tested."

Washington thus decided to discard its own ruse used at first to calm a public alarmed by the White House's intent to move the arms race into space. Not very long ago Washington was giving assurances that it was a question allegedly of inoffensive "scientific research and development" which was far from practical implementation. Now, however, it is announced that they can move into the stage of practical experiments in two years. With regard to the myth according to which the entire "star wars" program allegedly was nothing more than a trump in the Americans' hand for playing a diplomatic game, that essentially was dispelled by President R. Reagan himself. Speaking in the White House at a meeting with a group of scientists, he declared: "The strategic defense initiative is not a trump card at talks. It is a historic program in the interests of our national defense and in the interests of preserving peace throughout the world, and we intend to implement it."

The following statement by Under Secretary of Defense F. Ikle before the Senate Commission on Medium-Range Strategic and Nuclear Forces also is indicative: "The strategic defense initiative is not an alternative program in the backyards of defense efforts. It is a central one."

And so it is not a question of abstract preliminary research "just in case," so to speak, but a question of planned actions being carried out under a specific timetable, and even ahead of schedule.

As already noted, the persistent attempt of the American administration to shift the arms race into space is fraught with dangerous consequences. The authors of the "Count-Down to Space War" prepared by the Stockholm Research Institute (SIPRI) correctly emphasized that its consequence would be the fact that the United States and the USSR would begin one more spiral of the arms race. In their opinion, there would begin "not only an obvious, but also a costly competition in the area of lasers within the scope of antisatellite defense, and one of the retaliatory reactions on both sides would consist of a sharp increase in their offensive nuclear arsenals. This would assure a situation where some nuclear missiles would reach their targets despite the opposing ballistic missile defense. Thus lasers in reality could accelerate the race of nuclear arms without having made nuclear weapons obsolete."

Based on an analysis of the "star wars" program, American scientists with a worldwide reputation Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin, Kurt Gottfried and Henry Kendall concluded that "it is difficult to imagine a system more fraught with the appearance of disaster than the one requiring critical decisions in a matter of seconds, which is in itself untested and fragile, and which at the same time threatens the possibility of the other side's retaliation."

The viewpoint of such authoritative American figures as McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith also is known. In their words, "it is decisively impossible to ignore the fact that the 'star wars' do not promise increased security, but an indisputable and significant build-up both in offensive and defensive systems on both sides." They are convinced that "this is a recipe not for elimination or limitation of the threat stemming from nuclear weapons, but for a competition unlimited in expenditures, duration and danger."

That is the prospect which is inevitable. "If preparations for 'star wars' continue," emphasized M. S. Gorbachev, speaking in Warsaw, "we will be left with no other choice than to take retaliatory steps including of course a strengthening and improvement of offensive nuclear arms."

The Soviet Union proposes to block the path of arms into space and to solve this problem fundamentally without leaving any loopholes for militarization of outer space. Following its fundamental political course, it introduced a draft treaty in 1983 for prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from space with respect to Earth. This step also would presume in particular a total rejection of antisatellite weapons, including the destruction of such systems already in existence. In an attempt to facilitate the attainment of an understanding, the USSR unilaterally declared a moratorium on the placement of antisatellite weapons into space so long as other countries act in the very same manner.

The matter of preventing a militarization of space brooks no delay. In an attempt to assist this in every way, the Soviet Union introduced the question "Use of Outer Space Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes and for the Welfare of Mankind" to the agenda of the General Assembly's XXXIX Session as an important and urgent matter.

This initiative was a continuation of the USSR's consistent line toward preventing an arms race in space and eliminating the threat of nuclear war. The issue is that attack weapons of any kind--conventional, nuclear, laser, beam or any other--shall not be placed into space or deployed there, whether it be in manned or unmanned systems. Space weapons of any kinds of basing shall not be developed, tested or deployed for ballistic missile defense, as antisatellite weapons, or for use against targets on Earth or in the air. Such weapons which already have been developed shall be destroyed.

The use of force in space and from space against Earth, as well as from Earth against objects in space must be banned forever. The USSR proposes to come to an agreement on a radical solution to the question of preventing the militarization of space—the prevention and elimination of the entire class of space attack arms including space—based antisatellite and antimissile weapons, as well as any ground—based, air—based or sea—based weapons intended for destroying space objects.

An understanding to prohibit and eliminate entirely the class of space attack weapons lends itself fully to reliable and effective verification of the parties' observance of obligations. Verification already is facilitated by virtue of the fact that it is a question of a complete ban on development of such weapons and destruction of those few already developed.

Our country proposes that the USSR and United States introduce a moratorium on the development of space weapons and freeze strategic nuclear arsenals for the entire period of bilateral talks in Geneva. The goals by which the Soviet Union is guided here are clear and specific. They are a strengthening of general security, termination of the nuclear arms race, and keeping it out of space. Unfortunately the American side refuses to discuss the question of the

nonextension of the arms race to outer space at Geneva, in violation of a preliminary understanding. The U.S. administration responds with "no" at cosmic speed to the USSR's new peace initiatives.

Meanwhile it is completely obvious that it is impossible to consider questions of strategic nuclear arms and of medium-range nuclear weapons without considering questions of space and the nonmilitarization of outer space.

The White House's lack of desire to give up plans for militarization of space has become the "chief stumbling block" at the Geneva talks. This block has to be removed. Space must be preserved as a sphere of cooperation and not as an arena for a destructive arms race.

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ROME STATEMENT ON SDI PARTICIPATION

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[Text] (ANSA) Rome, July 31 -- The Italian Government issued a statement Tuesday saying that "should Italy take part in the U.S.-proposed Strategic Defense Initiative research this does not mean Italy automatically supports the strategic concept of the initiative".

The statement was issued at the end of an interministerial meeting chaired by the undersecretary to the prime minister's office, Giuliano Amato. The meeting was held to discuss Italian participation in research for the so-called "star wars" program which will cost an estimated 26 billion dollars over a five-year period.

As for Italian participation, the statement said, "further information is needed to have the most complete possible picture of the conditions in which cooperation could take place", adding that "new procedures of consultations of a technical-industrial nature between Italy and the United States are needed". The statement said examination of the political implications of Italian participation in the program is completely separate.

ITALY'S ANDREOTTI COMMENTS ON SDI, EUREKA

DW291047 Baden-Baden Suedwestfunk Network in German 1045 GMT 28 Jul 85

[Interview with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti by correspondent Kusch; date and place not given; answers in Italian with superimposed German translation -- recorded]

[Excerpt] [Kusch] Are Eureka and SDI in competition with each other or can they be combined?

[Andreotti] I believe the Eureka project would have been launched even if the U.S. defense project had not existed. It was born because technological cooperation still has not started and because it obviously is difficult to coordinate joint efforts in research. Of course, it may well be that some of these projects coincide with the SDI -- projects such as miniaturization and laser technology. Other aspects might also be congruent. However, in the final analysis they are two different projects. The objectives of Eureka are exclusively civilian in nature whereas SDI has a military purpose which, however, does not rule out the possibility that it will also produce results beneficial to civilian research. Thus, both program can very well coexist.

cso: 5200/2723

PHILIPS EXPECTS LITTLE FROM SDI, PREFERS EUREKA CONCEPT

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 25 Jun 85 p 13

[Report by Wubbo Tempel and Ben van der Velden: "Philips Expects Little from SDI and Sees More Possibilities in Eureka]

[Text] Eindhoven, 25 June--Philips doesn't expect much of SDI, the American research program into space defense, for European industry. The Eureka plan for technological cooperation in Europe, on the other hand, could offer the European electronics industry more possibilities.

According to sources at Philips, deliberation is taking place among 12 large European industries about the manner in which Eureka might be realized. Philips is the most important Dutch industry which might participate in programs such as Eureka or SDI. Philips would like to see a program set up within Eureka for research and production in the area of telecommunication, in the spirit of the "RACE" program [Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies for Europe]. Moreover, it would want to propose a Eureka program for a radar system for the benefit of air traffic control in all of Europe.

One condition for a successful Eureka program would be that it would have to be of a sufficient size, that is to say with a budget of over 1 billion ECU [European Currency Units] (2.5 billion guilders) per year. Moreover Eureka must consist of original research and must become greater than the combination of research projects already under way.

At Philips the emphasis is primarily on the fact that the program must not consist of research only, but that it must also result in production. Philips has no need for programs exclusively in the form of ESPRIT [European Strategic Program for Research and Development in Information Technology]. ESPRIT is a large program with which the European Community stimulates research in information technology at European companies and universities. That takes a lot of time of high-level scientists. There is not an unlimited supply of such scientists in industry. Moreover, it is significant that the E.C. subsidizes similar research by only 50 percent, while those who carry out similar research projects for the American Department of Defense get 108 percent compensation for their costs, that is to say including a profit margin.

In order to make a Eureka program for the electronics industry a success, it is essential, according to Philips, to include in it a European standardization of electronic apparatus, the removal of European trade obstacles, and moreover the initiation of cooperation between important principals. In the case of telephone communication, for example, those are the national PTTs [Post, Telegraph and Telephone].

Rational

Philips sees far fewer possibilities in the American SDI program than in Eureka. At Philips they say they are not "skeptical" about SDI but merely "rational with respect to the possibilities."

According to Philips, at most \$1 billion of the \$26 billion budgeted for the SDI research will be spent in Europe. With this money the Americans will primarily want to buy knowledge they don't have themselves. Moreover, there is no connection between a research project and a potential order for production. Philips on the other hand wants to arrive at production via a research order. Philips considers the possibility very small that participation in SDI will lead to acquisition of knowledge from other parts of the program. The transfer of knowledge is not customary in such defense technologies.

Further it is still not clear to Philips what exactly the SDI program will consist of and how the company might potentially contribute. It is not customary in defense contracts to ask details about the technology, nor is it customary to offer them. As to Philips, in considering whether Dutch industry might be able to furnish a contribution, it still is a matter of "probing."

Subsidiaries

Thus, for the time being, Philips doesn't know whether it possesses any unique knowledge which the competing American companies don't have. The concern expects that Dutch industry will at most be able to participate in the SDI program as subcontractors. To this end discussions have been held with Fokker, TNO [Netherlands Central Organization for Applied Natural Scientific Research] and the National Aeronautic and Space Travel Laboratory, with whom a consortium could be set up. The term "subcontractor," which disturbed French President Mitterrand, does not sound unfavorable to Philips, which called it "realistic." SDI is an American program and thus the contracts first go to American industries.

For that matter, the American subsidiaries of Philips are independent of Eindhoven in the acquisition of orders from the American defense industry. Philips in Eindhoven has no access to the accompanying defense technology. According to Philips Eindhoven, the American subsidiary Magnavox, which maintains an entirely independent contact with the SDI bureau in Washington, has not yet received any orders for participation in the SDI program.

The fact that the British Heriot-Watt university in Edinburgh has received a research order from the SDI organization is not considered important by Philips for the position of the European industry. "We would never accept

such an order. In the university world something like that is different from in industry." The British researchers are getting \$150,000 for the work on optical computers, while they are furnishing millions in knowledge to the Americans. An industry is not interested in only being allowed to do research, but it also wants to produce something.

Also the fact that the SDI organization approached this British university group is not surprising to Philips. "Everyone knows from publications that they are the ones to contact for this type of work." For reasons relating to competition, industries usually prefer not to attract attention with publications.

Massage

At Philips, SDI is primarily seen as a strengthening of the American technological foundation. By participating in SDI a European industry does not gain access to that technological foundation. One advantage of SDI is the "massage effect" that the program has already had in Europe. "One is aware that something is happening in the United States," is being said at Philips. Through that, it will be realized that the European competitive position can be strengthened through cooperation in Eureka.

8700 CSO: 3698/551

PORTUGUESE OFFICIAL ASSESSES EUREKA POTENTIAL

PM291052 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 20 Jul 85 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Special Credits Within Eureka Framework"]

[Text] The country's future depends on the modernization of Portuguese industry, and modernization depends on the new technologies' ability to develop, Minister Jaime Gama stated yesterday on arriving from Paris, where he discussed with European counterparts in the foreign affairs field the groundwork for European technological cooperation.

Jaime Gama pointed out that "the Europe of the 17 involved in the Eureka project represents great potential for applying the new technologies to industry." This project, the minister added, "requires models of financing, not only for enterprises, but also resources for the European Investment Bank, with special lines of credit."

Contacts were established in France with a view to preparing a project within the Eureka framework in cooperation with the National Laboratory of Engineering and Industrial Technology [LNETI] and the University of Aveiro. But Jaime Gama also mentioned, while he was in Paris, artificial intelligence, lasers, communications electronics, robotics, optronics and oceanography, for which there are already joint initiatives by the government, the research institutions, and enterprises, as areas of possible Portuguese participation.

The minister disclosed that a seminar on initiatives in the field of advanced technology and its applications, organized by the Portuguese authorities and by the European Commission for Science, will take place in the fall. Jaime Gama announced that other measures beyond Eureka will be adopted soon in the areas of oceanography, astrophysics, and astronomy.

Jaime Gama was accompanied to Paris by National Scientific and Technological Council Deputy Chairman Mario Abreu and LNETI researcher Carvalho Rodigrues.

Mario Abreu stated that Portugal has real prospects of applying in the Eureka project the fount of knowledge already developed in high technology fields such as the laser and artificial intelligence. Mario Abreu said that Portuguese enterprises taking part will have "definite advantages" since the initiatives within the Eureka framework are oriented toward industry and the production of prototypes and even products.

PORTUGUESE SATELLITE STATION SEEN AS CONTRIBUTION TO SDI

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 7 Jun 85 p 4

[Article: "Star Wars" Touches Almodovar]

[Excerpt] Portugal is going to contribute to the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), despite the fact that it has not yet signed either of the scientific and technological research projects (SDI and Eureka), and possibly become part of both, according to an investigation conducted by the Portuguese News Agency (ANOP).

In granting the United States authorization to build a satellite tracking station in Almodovar (Alentejo), Portugal is contributing to the implementation of the SDI despite the fact that the station represents a minimal part of the whole project.

The tracking station is a ground electro-optical system to scan outer space and is completely passive.

The system will detect the light reflected from satellites or other objects in outer space and can locate a reflected object the size of a football at a distance of 30,000 kilometers from the earth.

The data obtained will then be transmitted to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), where all information pertaining to defense is centered.

The tracking station that is going to be built in Portugal completes the system, which includes five stations located equidistant from one another around the world. The others are located in Socorro, New Mexico, in the United States; Maui, Hawaii; Taegu, Korea and Diego Garcia Island, in the Indian Ocean, the latter also not yet completed.

About 50 American technicians will work at the tracking station during the operational phase; the remainder of the personnel, including those needed to build it, will be contracted in the local market.

Negotiations on this station have not yet been concluded, consequently, Portugal could come to demand other complementary compensation besides that already anticipated.

Contradictions

Portugal's authorization for the construction of the tracking station might appear to be in contradiction to the fact that neither of the projects has yet been subscribed to.

However, besides the fact that the station has not been presented as an integral, even if minimal, part of the SDI, Portugal should sign the two projects in keeping with the policy for which it has opted in relation to the United States and Europe.

In fact, as an old ally of the United States, Portugal could not fail to subscribe to the SDI. In the meantime, the minister of foreign affairs, Jaime Gama, recognizes that there is "a relationship between the request for membership in the West European Union and Portugal's desire to assert itself in Europe, not only at the economic, scientific and technical levels, but also in the area of security and defense." For that reason, Portugal is also going to subscribe to the Eureka Project, the name of a European research agency. Portugal's need to develop its economic policy with the United States and Europe is not alien to this Portuguese position.

Portugal's interest in the Common Market, along with other things, leads it to join Europe "with its whole body," that is, to share all of its interests at the political, cultural, scientific or defense levels.

For that reason, Portugal has already signed the request for membership in the West European Union, an organization that France plans to relaunch with the aims for which it was originally created: the common defense of Europe.

8711

SALT/START ISSUES

MOSCOW CITES NEW YORK TIMES ON U.S. 'FALSIFICATION' ABOUT SS-19

LD202218 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 20 Jul 85

[Text] It has been reported that the United States Defense Department has deliberately falsified facts about Soviet missiles, known in the West as SS-19, in order to push through its own program to build up strategic armaments. Details from our commentator, Vikktor Olin, who writes.

According to the NEW YORK TIMES, the tale about horrible Soviet SS-19 missiles has been utilized by the Pentagon to go ahead with a program to develop the latest strategic MX missiles and to break down the military strategic parity. The tale has also been used to justify the intractable stand of the United States at the talks to limit armaments. Concretely, the falsification has been embodied in a concept of a so-called window of vulnerability, or, in other words, about an allegedly total lack of defense for the United States in the face of a mythical Soviet nuclear missile threat. This is an extra indication that the Pentagon resorts without hesitation to distorting facts in a bid to gain military superiority. There have been plentiful examples of that.

The alleged Soviet threat has been used on many occasions to accelerate the arms race. The race began soon after the end of the Second World War. At that time the Soviet Union proposed banning the production and use of nuclear weapons and destroying their stockpiles. However, the United States rejected the proposal, counting on its monopoly on nuclear weapons. As a result, today there are more than 50,000 nuclear warheads around the world which are enough to destroy human civilization many times over. But matters went farther than that. In the early 1950's a noisy campaign was launched in the United States about its alleged lag behind the Soviet Union in heavy bombers. Having scared Congress, the Pentagon won allocations to create a fleet of strategic bombers capable of dropping nuclear arms on the Soviet Union. It was later revealed that the United States military had overestimated the Soviet aviation potential by three to four times.

History repeated itself in the early 1960's when noises were made again about some sort of Soviet superiority in land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. After getting the necessary funds from Congress the Pentagon revealed that the so-called Soviet missile threat had been exaggerated by 15 to 20 times.

The following conclusions can be drawn from these examples. The first one is: With the support and encouragement of the administration, the Pentagon no longer shies from direct deception of Congress and the public in carrying through enormous armaments programs. The second conclusion is that the masterminds of the falsification have poor fantasy, as they resort to one and the same routine method for many years now. And the third conclusion: Intending to reach its objective by deception, that is, to get ahead of the USSR militarily and to get a chance to dictate terms to it, the United States has failed invariably as a result of Soviet retaliatory measures to equalize things.

Today we can see another campaign of falsification being mounted by Washington. This time a claim is made that the United States lags behind the USSR in space arms. Thus the foundation is laid for the star wars program, that is of militarizing space.

(?Again) the United States banks on intimidating the public so as to have it act contrary to common sense.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS CITES UK PAPER ON U.S. CRUISE MISSILE TESTS IN CANADA

LD291433 Moscow TASS in English 1046 GMT 19 Jul 85

[Text] London, July 29 TASS -- One conclusion prompted by an "OBSERVER" article devoted to the U.S. programme to test cruise missile in Canada is that the Washington administration is involving its NATO allies more and more extensively in its own war preparations.

Next year, the newspaper says, will see the beginning of another phase of a U.S.-Canadian agreement in operation for two years, under which "the U.S. has permission to launch up to six missiles a year over northern Canada." During the first phase, defying the strong protest of the Canadian public, the Pentagon carried out two tests in Canada to check the performance of missiles.

The testing programme will be made more sophisticated beginning with next January, the newspaper says quoting U.S. sources. Missiles will be launched from B-52 bombers in the far north of Canada along a 1,600-mile corridor. Their target will be cold lake on the Alberta-Saskatchewan border, and interceptor fighters will try to neutralize them. "American and Canadian warplanes will try to find the cruise missiles on their radars and pretend to attack them. Each missile will carry a device which will record the results," the newspaper says.

Washington is also planning under that arms buildup programme to carry out an extensive modernization of a Canada-based early warning system. The U.S. Congress, according to the newspaper, has already approved an expenditure of 1.2 billion dollars for the purpose.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS CITES DUTCH LABOR PARTY: NO COMPROMISE ON MISSILES

LD261657 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT 26 Jul 85

[Text] The Hague July 26 TASS -- The Dutch Labour Party will not consent to a compromise with the ruling bourgeois parties that would bring about a deployment of American cruise missiles in the country, it was stated by the party's parliamentary spokesman on defence matters Klaas de Vries. He stressed that attempts to adopt a decision in favour of deploying the missiles and to get it through Parliament before the holding of the scheduled parliamentary elections would create a crsis situation. Klaas de Vries said that the planned signing of an agreement with the United States would affect questions of Dutch sovereignty and its approval by parliament would require a two thirds majority vote. There is no such majority in the present parliament, he stated, and the more so cannot be in the new parliament because most Dutch voters now support the parties that object to the deployment of the missiles.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

IZVESTIYA SEES SIGNS OF PROGRESS AT CLOSE OF SESSION

PM301054 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by Yu. Rakhmaninov under the rubric "At the Stockholm Conference": "Businesslike Pace Required"]

[Text] The latest session of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe has finished. A recess has been declared until the fall. Usually this period is used for taking stock, evaluating the prevailing situation, and making forecasts.

Summing up the closing attitude at the conference in Stockholm, it can be said that the needle on the conference barometer, although it is wavering, is nevertheless slowly turning towards "fair." In the intense struggle between the two directions in the international arena, the line of maintaining and developing detente pursued by socialist and other countries is making headway in Stockholm. This is shown by the organization, on the neutral countries' initiative, of two working committees where both the political and the military aspects of confidence-building are examined on an equal basis. It can also be seen in the fact that attempts to restrict the subject matter of the conference by limiting it to secondary military-technical questions failed. Discussion of the key problems of building confidence and security were the central issues at the conference.

The Warsaw ract countries' joint large-scale initiatives thus determined the broad approach to the conference's work and its main thrust and forms of organization. And this is natural, since the political and miliary aspects of European security constitute the main components in resolving the vital tasks facing the Stockholm forum.

In this context, what should first be assessed is the positive shifts in Stockholm on the question of the nonuse of force. The socialist countries' proposal on the nonuse of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations formed the core of the political discussion. This is entirely natural if one proceeds from the main goal of the conference, to take new and specific action in this sphere. Many Western countries are now advocating that the principle of the nonuse of force be made as binding as possible and that it be given specific expression in accordance with the pressing requirements of European reality.

An accord giving the force of an international law to an international pledge to refrain from the use of military force is now urgently needed from the standpoint of political realism and responsibility for the fate of the peoples. The need to reach such an accord is also dictated by the entire present situation, where the threat of the use of

force, including in its most dangerous, nuclear, form, is growing all the time not only on earth but also in space.

The Soviet Union and the socialist countries are convinced that the potential exists for effecting a change for the better in the international situation. And their proposal on the nonuse of military force is directed to that end. A consensus on this score would help bring about a sharp turnaround in states' policies away from confrontation and toward peaceful cooperation. Such an accord would establish the fundamental basis for the whole process of confidence— and security—building and disarmament in Europe.

Representatives of the NATO countries, for their part, offer assurances of their readiness to examine the question of the nonuse of force. President Reagan, for example, has stated that "the United States is ready to discuss the Soviet proposal on the nonuse of force." Giving concrete expression, as it were, to the U.S. stance, Ambassador Goodby, head of the American delegation at the conference, told a press conference that the examination of the question of the nonuse of force should include "all types of weapons, including nuclear weapons. We do not exclude any types of weapons when we speak about the nonuse of force." Unfortunately, apart from these verbal promises from the NATO countries, no real steps toward an accord on this key issue have been seen yet. However, hints are being dropped that, since the proposal in question has been made by the socialist countries, they should "pay a price" for its adoption. A trade-off on this question, however, is inappropriate. The need to resolve it stems from the joint commitments assumed by the states that signed the Final Act and from the Stockholm conference's mandate. All of the states have an equal interest in making a pledge on the nonuse of force effective, and no one is doing anyone any favors here.

Proceeding from a broad conception of security, the socialist countries have also proposed major measures aimed at reducing the danger of military confrontation and achieving military detente in Europe. They have submitted working documents on limiting the scale of military exercises and on issuing notification of major military exercises by ground, air, and naval forces and major troop movements and transfers. These documents also take into account considerations expressed by representatives of neutral and nonaligned states and certain NATO countries. They signify a practical development of the Helsinki Final Act in important new accords.

Indeed, surely there is an urgent need for an accord limiting the scale of military exercises?

After all, present-day military exercises, particularly those of NATO countries, have reached such dimensions that it is difficult to distinguish them from preparations for the start of combat operations. They are therefore bound to create tension and suspicion even if notification of them is given.

An accord on the notification not only of major military exercises by ground forces but also major air and naval exercises in the maritime (ocean) region and airspace adjoining Europe would also be in the interests of peace and confidence building. Thousands of warplanes and hundreds of ships, including aircraft carriers equipped with nuclear weapons, some of which are long-range cruise missiles, take part in these exercises. Maneuvers in Europe and its surrounding seas (oceans) and airspace by air forces and navies capable of carrying out strikes at sea, in the air, and on land naturally affect the security interest of European states. In line with the NATO concept of "integrated defense," these maneuvers are by necessity linked to the military activity of NATO Armed Forces on members' teritories. Nor should one forget the lessons of history

regarding the role played by the air force and navy in launching World War II and in the fascist aggressors' occupation of a number of European countries.

The question of issuing notification of major troop movements and transfers also deserves the most serious attention. This kind of military activity can be the source of a serious threat to states' security, a threat which has significantly increased in recent times. The scale and threateneing character of major troop transfers, especially from the United States to Europe, show the need for notification of such military activity if one is really seeking to build confidence and security.

Success at the Stockholm forum, of course, can be achieved only through the joint efforts of all its participants. A positive role is being played here by the majority of neutral and nonaligned countries, which advocate the speediest possible transition in Stockholm to seeking mutually acceptable solutions and step-by-step progress at Stockholm. This idea is arousing interest, although everything will depend on what the subject of the first accords actually turns out to be.

A desire to achieve positive results in Stockholm has also been shown by a number of NATO countries. This was particularly shown during the Soviet-Italian talks in May, which pointed to a certain closeness in each side's approach to the conference's work. The conviction was voiced that Europe can and must play a substantial and vital role in the active search for ways to return international relations to the path of detente. From this standpoint, progress in Stockholm can be seen as a barometer of political feeling in the European capitals and as an indicator of Europeans' perception of their security interests.

The work of the conference has brought to light not only potential for progress but also serious difficulties, which have simply prevented any move to substantive talks. The main obstacle here is the rigid, frozen stance adopted by the United States and its NATO allies. They are still unable to give up their futile attempts to obtain unilateral advantages at Stockholm to the detriment of other states' security. Their proposals unjustifiably overemphasize questions of information and verification, including the conduct of onsite inspection, which leads to legalized espionage and interference in other states' internal affairs. The NATO countries stress notification of ground forces' so-called "off-base activity," which essentially means revising the relevant provisions of the Final Act on major military exercises and troop movements and, consequently, also complicates the achievement of an accord on these questions. The NATO package of proposals excludes measures to limit the scale of military exercises and issue notification of the most dangerous kinds of air force and naval activity.

On the whole the package combines both provisions which include elements of confidence-building measures and provisions which go beyond the bounds of the conference mandate and undermine the basis of the Final Act. The interest of the talks, if one wishes them to be successful, require that the diplomacy of linkage be abandoned. Any attempts to artifically link work with other issues unrelated to the conference's tasks, which can only complicate the situation there, are likewise unacceptable.

Developments at the conference show that the time has come to abandon the attempt to slow its work and to remove the artificial barriers which stand in the way of concrete talks.

The Soviet Union and the socialist countries urge that the Stockholm conference work more boldly for an accord which would combine major measures of a political nature with specific mutually acceptable measures in the military sphere. The achievement of weighty agreements in Stockholm would be a substantial contribution to strengthening peace in Europe and to further developing the all-European process. This would indeed a substantial contribution of the historic significance of the Helsinki Final Act, whose total acceptable being celebrated by the peoples and states that signed it.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

TASS HITS SPEECH OF SWEDISH CHIEF DELEGATE

LD251724 Moscow TASS in English 1712 GMT 25 Jul 85

[Text] Stockholm July 25 TASS -- The head of Sweden's delegation to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures, and Disarmament in Europe, Ambassador Curt Lidgard, speaking at the Club of the Swedish city of Malmo, said that allegedly Western Europe was under the threat of a sudden attack from the Soviet Union and that the USSR could capture Sweden within two days. Curt Lidgard, with his imagination running high, contradicting facts, went still further and said that the USSR allegedly does not wish to put forward "serious proposals" in the sphere of disarmament.

One is perplexed by such pronouncements of the Swedish ambassador. The impression is that he does not know anything about the Soviet proposals which were made exactly at the Stockholm conference, the proposals which embrace not only questions of disarmament but a broader range of problems. Ambassador Lidgard's pronouncements are irresponsible and harmful, also from the viewpoint of the calm situation in the north of Europe.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

YUGOSLAV DISARMAMENT OFFICIAL ON HELSINKI FINAL ACT

LD241326 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1130 GMT 24 Jul 85

[Text] Belgrade, July 24 (TANJUG) -- The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in Helsinki 10 years ago, constitutes a basis for a positive turn in relations among the signatory-states themselves, and in their relations with the rest of the world.

The fact that the provisions of the Helsinki document have not been fully implemented after 10 years is due to inter-bloc confrontation in Europe, Aleksandar Bozovic, head of the Yugoslav delegation at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, has told TANJUG.

Bozovic said that as much as possible, in view of (?the aggravated) relations in Europe, had been done in translating the Helsinki principles into practice in the past ten years.

Bozovic described a success in itself the fact that numerous meetings on cooperation in Europe followed the Helsinki conference.

He singled out the CSCE follow-ups in Belgrade and Madrid, and a number of others, at which substantive exchanges of views enabled the participating countries to get better acquainted with one another's opinions of the situation in Europe and the world in general, and of the ways to create normal conditions for implementing the Helsinki document.

Bozovic described as of the utmost importance the Stockholm conference devoted to confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

Talks on open questions in Europe will be possible if all 33 CSCE participating countries adhere to the accord signed in Helsinki 10 years ago, and respect the principles of equality, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in international relations. In the meantime, the CSCE Final Act remains only Europe's great hope, Bozovic underlined

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

TASS REPORTS DELEGATES' SPEECHES

Chemical Arms Discussed

LD251453 Moscow TASS in English 1435 GMT 25 Jul 85

[Text] Geneva July 25 TASS -- TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Korzhev reports:

The latest sessions of the Geneva Disarmament Conference have centered on the issue of prohibition of chemical weapons. An overwhelming majority of the participants favour that an appropriate international convention whose contours have already become visible, be most speedily drawn up. This was pointed out by representatives of Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cuba, Canada and other countries.

The GDR delegation has tabled today a working document on the measures of verification of observance of the future convention. A number of proposals attesting to the wish of its authors to contribute to progress has been tabled by the delegations of Sweden and Japan.

It is also no less clear, on the other hand, that the stand of the USA is one of the main obstacles in the way of progress. The latest statement by Donald Lowitz, head of the American delegation, has borne out that the USA views its draft convention tabled last year as some kind of an ultimatum, albeit, as the debate has shown, that draft far from facilitating the task, has, on the contrary created new considerable difficulties. Other evidence of the reluctance of the U.S. side to heed criticism has been the statement by Lowitz that the recent approval by the U.S. Congress of the appropriations on the production of new, so-called binary chemical munitions is, allegedly, no obstacle to talks, but, as he put it, evidence of the wish of the USA to ban chemical weapons.

Viktor Israelyan, the head of the Soviet delegation, has pointed today to the hypocritical, perverse character of such an attitude to the talks. The USA, he said, adopts a programme to create and deploy a new type of weapons, then sits down at the negotiating table in order, as it claims, to prohibit them, demands that the partners accept their terms, and when that does not happen as the terms put forward by it are clearly unacceptable, declares that no agreement has been reached and therefore it has no way out but to start the deployment of some or other new type of weapons. This manner of conducting talks, the Soviet representative said, pursues the aim not of reaching agreement, but of justifying the requests for fresh military appropriations.

Viktor Israelyan has rejected as absolutely unfounded, the demagogic and at times openly slanderous charges made by the U.S. representatives against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. None other than the USA used chemical weapons on a vast

scale in Indochina, whose victims were two million Vitenamese. The USA has a huge arsenal of chemical weapons, to which binary weapons are to be added now.

The whole policy of the USA on the issue of prohibition of chemical weapons over the past fifteen years is indicative of its striving to prevent such a prohibition, to hamper the course of the talks, the Soviet representative stressed. The U.S. side should display true flexibility to make success of the talks possible.

Criticism of U.S.

LD302003 Moscow TASS in English 1850 GMT 30 Jul 85

[Text] Geneva, July 30 TASS -- A majority of the delegates who spoke at today's plenary meeting of the conference on disarmament criticized the obstructionist stand of Western powers with the United States at the head, holding back the practical consideration of the important issue of preventing nuclear war, including the establishment of a special auxiliary body of the conference. Representatives of Poland, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Cuba, India, Mexico and a number of other delegations stressed that in response to all positive initiatives and efforts of socialist and nonaligned states came the invariable "no" from the West. Alfonso Garcia Robles (Mexico) described such an approach as absurd. In the words of the Soviet representative Yuriy Nazarkin, Western delegations ignored the views and aspirations of other states, as well as decisions of the United Nations General Assembly.

The head of the delegation of Sri Lanka, Jayanta Dhanapala, condemned the plan of the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative". Its realization, he said, would mean a new and dangerous spiral of the arms race and its spread to outer space. Urgent steps should be made to ward off this threat, and the introduction of a moratorium on the development, including research, testing and deployment of attack space weapons, could become one of such steps. The representative of Sri Lanka expressed the hope that the issue would feature prominently at the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

FURTHER SOVIET ATTACKS ON CONGRESSIONAL BINARY-ARMS VOTE

Moscow World Service

LD251522 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 25 Jul 85

[Commentary by Viktor Olin]

[Text] In the United States negotiators from the two Houses of Congress have reached an accord to permit the manufacture of the most advanced chemical weapons. Here is a comment on this Washington report. It is by our observer, Viktor Olin.

At the end of May appropriations for the production of chemical weapons were approved by the Senate. Then the House of Representatives, under pressure from the administration, voted \$125 million for this purpose in the 1986 fiscal year, which begins on 1st October. The only obstacle to the inclusion of these appropriations in the draft budget was the requirement stipulated by the House that the administration secure consnet of Washington's West European allies to the deployment of the new chemical weapons on their territory. Now this requirement has been dropped. All that is required is consultation with the allies, whose opinion will not be binding in the United States. In other words, here we have yet another example of the supposedly equitable cooperation between the United States and its West European NATO partners. It has been practically predetermined that they will accommodate the new American chemical arms depots whether they like it or not and Washington is making no secret of the fact that Western Europe is seen as the main theater of chemical warfare.

To allay the mounting alarm of the West Europeans over this chemical menace they are being told that the new weapons are quite safe because they consist of two segregated components, each of which is, separately, harmless. It is also being argued that these binary weapons are needed to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on a total chemical weapons ban. Reality, however, refutes these false arguments. Mountains of weapons aren't built up just to prohibit them. On the contrary, the program for radically modernizing and building up America's chemical weapons arsenals is designed to keep them intact even should a chemical weapons ban be agreed upon. And that means the threat of chemical annihilation will always loom over Europe and the rest of the world.

American strategists base their plans on the assumption that binary shells can be kept unsupervised by storing their components separately, disguised as nonmilitary chemicals. In that case even the most thorough inspection procedures would fail to uncover them since these substances will not require the safety measures and equipment that verification relies upon. This intention of keeping American chemical arsenals intact is also evident from Washington's persistent efforts to assure immunity from verification

for private plants, which produce the bulk of America's chemical shells. In this context it becomes obvious how interrelated are all the elements of the administration's policy on chemical weapons. Stockpiling is being logically integrated with efforts directed against banning such weapons.

IZVESTIYA Article

LD291327 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1555 GMT 28 Jul 85

['Washington's Binary Stick" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jul (TASS) -- Yet another step along the path of stepping up the arms race has been taken in the United States, Boris Ivanov writes in IZVESTIYA. "A Congressional conference committee has decided to give the go-ahead to mass production of binary weapons with neuro-paralytic action -- a new generation of chemical weaponry."

"Earlier, the House of Representatives approved a \$124.5 billion allocation for these purposes in the 1986 financial year, beginning in October, Ivanov recalls. Thus, the Pentagon is being given the opportunity to switch on production lines of the above-mentioned weapons of mass destruction within only a few months."

"The Pentagon is not concealing its satisfaction over the decision made on Capitol Hill. After all, the creation of a binary stick fits in perfectly with Washington's aggressive militaristic ambitions.

"Pentagon strategists reckon that binary weapons could be used alongside nuclear weapons on the European continent. Washington has already begun mass brainwashing its NATO partners in an attempt to extort from them an agreement on the deployment of binary chemical weapons which is not being met with enthusiasm in the Old World," the author notes. "West Europeans rightly see the republican administration's plans as a threat to their own security. They are apprehensive that U.S. policy could transform their continent into a 'binary gas chamber.'

"These actions by the United States are contrary to the mood of the vast majority of the world's states, which are advocating a ban on chemical weapons," the author stresses.

Moscow Domestic Service

LD262119 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Jul 85

[Text] A TASS correspondent reports from Washington that American legislators have given the green light to the production of a new generation of chemical weapons. The conference Committee of the Congress discussing the bill on military spending in the coming financial year has made a decision that opens up the possibility of starting production of so-called binary ammunition in 1987. A late news commentary. At the microphone is Viktor Levin:

[Levin] The decision of the Conference Committee was preceded by approval by the House of Representatives for the allocation of 124.5 million dollars for the production of binary ammunition.

When the question of allocating these resources was being discussed, the congressmen resolved that production of chemical ammunition can only begin after the agreement of the NATO member-countries has been obtained for the deployment of these weapons on their territory. Now one can say with confidence that this was done with a view to camouflaging dangerous intentions. This condition has now been thrown aside and the legislators have come to the conclusion that it is quite sufficient to hold consultations with the NATO partners which places no obligations upon the USA.

Washington is taking another extremely dangerous step. Today, the Pentagon already has at its disposal one of the world's largest arsenals of chemical weapons. It has more than 3 million pieces of ammunition and 150,000 tonnes of war gases available. But this is not enough for American strategists who are dreaming of achieving military superiority. For several years, they have been obsessed by the idea of producing binary chemical weapons and of deploying them widely in western Europe.

What is binary ammunition? The casualty-producing effect of binary weapons is based upon the use of two nontoxic components or components of low toxicity which when they are mixed enter into a chemical reaction forming a highly toxic poisonous substance within a short time: hence the name, binary ammunition. Thanks to these properties, it is easier to store binary ammunition; and what is even more important for the Pentagon, production of the components can easily be organized at conventional enterprises within the peaceful chemicals industry. In the American capital they consider that this will make it possible to carry out chemical arming even in the event of a convention banning chemical weapons coming into force, something that the United States itself is seeking to prevent in every possible way.

At the disarmament conference taking place in Geneva, questions concerning the ban of chemical weapons are indeed now being discussed, and the American delegation is putting spokes in the wheels as far as the adoption of an international convention banning these weapons is concerned. The head of the U.S. delegation even went so far as to assert that the adoption by Congress of a decision to allocate millions in resources for the production of binary ammunition is allegedly no obstacle to the talks, but — just think — it points to the desire of the United States to ban chemical weapons. Truly there is no limit to the hypocrisy of American diplomacy as it tries to justify the unrestrained arms race unleashed by Washington.

The Soviet Union, as was stressed in the recent statement by TASS, resolutely condemns the plans for the production and deployment of binary weapons. Our country regards these intentions of the United States as a new crime against peace and against mankind.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

GDR'S AXEN VIEWS SED-SPD CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT PLAN

Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by SED Politburo member Hermann Axen: "A Real Confidence-Building Measure for Disarmament"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The SED and SPD drafted a document in Bonn last month proposing the creation of a chemical weapon-free zone in Europe. SED Politburo member Hermann Axen explains the significance of this agreement for relations between the two parties and the two German states.

The SED accepted this idea all the more readily since the Warsaw Pact states had made a very specific proposal back on 10 January 1984 to all the European states on freezing chemical weapons in Europe. As Erich Honecker recently stressed, in taking this political initiative with the SPD, the SED was working on the principle that the world has reached a point where all states -- large, medium, or small -- have a great responsibility.

The main task for averting a thermonuclear catastrophe consists of preventing the militarization of space and ending the nuclear arms race on earth. This is the aim of the Geneva negotiations, whose success the GDR wholeheartedly desires. Our party also emphasizes that progress in the arms limitation and disarmament spheres could improve the international climate and have a favorable influence on the Geneva negotiations between the USSR and the United States. It is in this spirit that we advocate that our continent should free itself from nuclear and chemical weapons, from a particularly terrible category of means of mass destruction. Their use is banned by the 1925 Geneva protocol, but production, stockpiling, or further development of them is not. There are therefore gigantic arsenals in Europe today comprising thousands of metric tons of these dangerous weapons. The use of chemical weapons would bring death or permanent suffering to millions of human beings, making our environment unihabitable. Even in peacetime technical flaws in the stored products can have disastrous consequences.

It is therefore extremely urgent to eliminate these abominable weapons from our planet forever. Thus the GDR, together with the other socialist countries, is advocating a world ban on chemical weapons at the UN disarmament conference in Geneva. Similarly we aspire to see regional measures taken aimed at eliminating these chemical weapons. The creation of a chemical weapon-free zone in Europe would contribute to disarmament at the international level, reducing the risk of chemical war in Europe to a considerable extent. The establishment of such a zone would counter the escalation of chemical weapons and the production and stockpiling of binary chemical weapons.

The documents published by the SED and SPD are based on the principles of equality, equal security, and strict respect for the sovereignty of states. They do not call into question a state's membership in different alliance systems. The two parties' security interests are fully guaranteed.

To progress toward a Europe free from chemical weapons, a chemical weapon-free zone could initially contain central Europe as defined by the Warsaw Pact and NATO states for the Vienna negotiations: namely Belgium, the CSSR, the GDR, the FRG, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the PPR. This zone would naturally be open to other states. According to the SED and SPD proposals, this zone should at least comprise the GDR, the FRG, and the CSSR — in other words, countries that are directly on the demarcation line between the two alliance systems in Europe. The states in this zone should pledge to free their territory or keep it free from chemical weapons and to neither produce nor procure chemical weapons.

The states in this zone should also pledge to not allow chemical weapons to be deployed or produced on or transported through their territory.

The states in this zone should call on countries with chemical weapons to respect its status as a chemical weapon-free zone and never to use or threaten to use chemical weapons against territories free from chemical weapons.

The SED and SPD advocate effective national and international monitoring, the scope and nature of which should be adapted to the scale of the disarmament measure.

The agreement reached between our parties should encourage interstate negotiations, with-out, however, being able to replace them or anticipate them.

We are very confident about the start of interstate negotiations. A powerful movement is developing in many European countries in favor of freeing our continent from chemical weapons.

With their participation, the two German states can take a practical step to ensure that war is never again launched from German soil. This would help create a climate that would favor other negotiations.

Peace is the most precious asset, and its preservation and consolidation are crucial. Peace has always been the ideal and objective of the workers' movement's struggles, and this is now more than ever true. Thus the SED advocates a universal coalition of reason and realism with all forces that consider peace important. A treaty valid in international law for the creation of a chemical weapon-free zone would be a real confidence-building measure with a view to arms limitation and disarmament.

cso: 5200/3071

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS REPORTS U.S. OFFICIALS' REMARKS ON NEW ZEALAND

Shultz 'Lashes Out'

LD161734 Moscow TASS in English 1653 GMT 16 Jul 85

[Text] New York July 16 TASS--U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz left Australia today after conferring with Prime Minister Robert Hawke, Defense Minister Kim Beazley and other Australian leaders.

The Associated Press New Agency said the talks had substituted for an annual conference of the military Anzus bloc's member states after New Zealand, whose government had decided to deny American warships with nuclear weapons access to its ports and territorial waters, had declined to attend.

Speaking at a press conference in Canberra, the U.S. State Secretary lashed out at New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy, threatening U.S. withdrawal from Anzus if Wellington enshrined a ban on the calls of American ships with nuclear weapons at New Zealand's ports in its legislation. The decision to do that was announced by Prime Minister David Lange earlier this month and officially brought to Shultz' notice the other day in Kuala Lumpur where he had attended a conference of the foreign ministers of the Asean countries as well as the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Armacost Interview

LD312010 Moscow TASS in English 1712 GMT 31 Jul 85

[Text] Camberra July 31 TASS -- The United States is pressurizing New Zealand in an attempt to make the government of that country lift the ban on calls by U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons at New Zealand ports. Michael Armacost, U.S. under secretary for political affairs, has threatened, for instance, to replace the ANZUS military bloc, formed by the United States, Australia and New Zealand, with bilateral U.S.-Australian union.

In an interview with Australian journalists, he said, in part, that the United States was studying the possibility of replacing ANZUS with a bilateral pact with Australia in case New Zealand legislatively bans visits to its ports by foreign ships with nuclear weapons on board. The local press points out in this connection that Washington goes on with its policy of brute blackmail of New Zealand, threatening to deny U.S. aid to it.

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET REPORTS OF GREEK-BULGARIAN TALKS ON BALKAN NFZ PLAN

Zhivkov on Balkan Policy

FM241004 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jul 85 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Strengthening Cooperation"]

[Text] Athens, 23 Jul -- T. Zhivkov, chairman of the Bulgarian State Council, who is on an official visit here, has begun talks with Greek statesmen and politicians.

Bulgaria's foreign policy, he noted in a speech at the reception held in his honor, is aimed at strengthening peace and mutual understanding among the peoples and at expanding equal cooperation among countries and peoples who sincerely desire this. Bulgaria actively and purposefully strengthens the positive processes in the Balkans and promotes the establishment of an atmosphere of good-neighborliness in this region.

T. Zhivkov noted that the strengthening of good-neighborly relations and mutual understanding among the peoples of the Balkan peninsula would be considerably promoted by the implementation of the idea of turning the region into a zone free of nuclear weapons. Bulgaria assesses highly the position of Greece on this question, he stressed.

Athens Talks End

LD241107 Moscow TASS in English 0950 GMT 24 Jul 85

[Text] Athens July 24 TASS -- Greek-Bulgarian talks between the President of the Council of State of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, and Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou of Greece were completed here. Speaking at a reception in honor of the Bulgarian leader, the head of the Greek Government said that during the talks the sides had confirmed their determination to overcome all obstacles in order to set up the first nuclear weapon-free zone in the Balkans. He also took note of the vast opportunities for the development of economic cooperation between the two countries. In his reply word Todor Zhivkov stressed that Bulgarian-Greek contacts had always developed in the spirit of friendship, understanding and frankness.

Press Conference

LD251124 Moscow TASS in English 1108 GMT 25 Jul 85

[Text] Athens July 25 TASS -- Todor Zhivkov, chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, ended his official visit to Greece. In the course of talks with Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and other officials, at which the sides discussed ways to ensure peace, to bridle the arms race and also further to promote bilateral contacts. The joint communique stresses that Bulgaria and Greece, despite the differences between their socio-political systems and their membership of the opposite alliances, can contribute substantially to the achievment of international detente and cooperation and to the safeguarding of peace. Important decisions were taken on the devlopment of economic relations to raise to an even higher level of cooperation between the two countries.

Addressing a press conference devoted to the results of the visit, Todor Zhivkov said that much attention had been devoted to the international situation during the talks with the Greek leaders. It is necessary to do everything possible before it is too late to scale down armed confrontation and to return international relations to the process of detente in the spirit of Helsinki because there is no other alternative. The most important thing today is to prevent the militarization of space and to achieve a restriction of the nuclear arms arsenals and reduction in them to the point of their complete elimination. The chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria stressed that Bulgaria and Greece could make a major contribution to the implementation of the idea of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Balkans.

Andreas Papandreou noted at the press conference that it is both a right and a duty of small non-nuclear countries to contribute in every way to efforts intended to ensure a return to detente, to prevent the militarization of space, to stop the deployment of nuclear weapons and to achieve disarmament on the basis of the principles of equality and equal security.

'Constructive Contribution'

PM301134 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jul 85 Morning Edition p 4

[B. Rodionov "International Commentary" under the "Topics of the Day" rubric: "A Constructive Contribution"]

[Text] Despite all the complexity of the present international situation, the socialist community countries proceed from the premise that changes for the better are possible. Each community country is striving to make its own contribution to the noble cause of normalizing East-West relations and continuing the process begun by the Helsinki Final Act 10 years ago. Their efforts have not been without result.

The recently completed official visit to Greece by Todor Zhivkov, chairman of the Bulgarian State Council, can serve as an example of this. It gave a new boost to the recently established relations of good-neighborliness and mutual trust and cooperation between the two Balkan countries. Economic ties, which are being built on the basis of the long-term program signed by them 3 years ago, have been raised to a higher level.

The results of the Athens talks have reconfirmed that the attempts by certain circles, since the time of the cold war, to disinter the once current thesis of "threat from the north" hanging over Greece have no chance of success. As the joint communique notes, both states, despite their differences in sociopolitical structure and membership in different alliances, are able to help to a considerable degree to achieve international detente and cooperation and to preserve peace. Both Bulgaria and Greece with to prevent the militarization space and advocate disarmament on the basis of equality and identical security.

The deep conviction was again expressed in Athens that the development of Bulgarian-Greek relations represents a common contribution by the two countries to strengthening trust, security, and cooperatin in the Balkans. Both countries are ready to make new efforts to turn the Balkans — the former "powder keg of Europe" — into a zone free of nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that its appearance would mark a significant step forward in reducing tension on the European continent as a whole. This represents the coordinated stance of all the socialist community countries.

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

SOUTH PACIFIC TALKS--The South Pacific Forum will hold its 16th meeting August 4 to 6 on Rarotonga when one of the items to be discussed will be the proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific. This meeting will be followed, at the same venue, by the Second Pacific Islands Conference, August 7 to 10, which will discuss the results of research on development conducted by the Pacific Islands Development Programme, formed in 1980 in Hawaii to help to meet special development needs of the region through cooperative research, education and training. [Text] [Sydney THE SOUTH SEA DIGEST in English 25 Jun 85 p 2]

NUCLEAR TESTING

USSR: NUCLEAR TEST BAN PROPOSALS AWAIT U.S. RESPONSE

PM291033 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 27 Jul 85 p 3

[Article by political observer Gennadiy Shishkin under the rubric "View of Events": "A Long Overdue Measure"]

[Excerpt] There are tens of thousands of nuclear warheads in the world's arsenals. Each warhead, on average, possesses far greater destructive power than the bombs which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The number of deaths and the scales of calamities in all the bloody wars in mankind's history, including the world wars, would fade into insignificance in the face of what could happen as a result of a general nuclear conflict. In the entire history of wars, the total quantity of explosive substances used has not exceeded 10 megatons, while today weapons with a total yield of more than 50,000 megatons are already stockpiled in the nuclear arsenals!

Nonetheless, today we are all witnessing the unparalleled stubbornness and consistency with which the Washington Administration is accelerating the buildup of these monstrous arsenals.

At the same time there is a real way of delivering not only Americans, but all mankind from the threat of nuclear catatrophe. It is to end the arms race and reverse it. And the first, simplest, andmost easily effected step along this path would be the conclusion of a treaty on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons tests. M.S. Gorbachev pointed to the tremendous significance of this measure in his interview for the Indian agency PRESS TRUST OF INDIA: "We have repeatedly called upon the United States and the other nuclear powers to do this. The USSR has proposed and proposes to the states which possess nuclear weapons that a moratorium be declared on all nuclear explosions, to operate until the conclusion of a treaty on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons tests. The moratorium could be imposed from 6 August 1985, that is, the date of the 40th anniversary of the tragic atomic bombing of Hiroshima -- or even earlier.

"The Soviet Union is also ready immediately to resume talks on a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests, talks which, as is known, were broken off through the fault of the United States. It is high time to bring into force the Soviet-American treaties signed in 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of undergound nuclear weapons tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which have still not been ratified — again, not through the fault of the Soviet side."

The Soviet Union's clear stance on one of the most urgent tasks in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and of disarmament enjoys broad support throughout the

world. After all, it is well known that nuclear tests lead to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the emergence of new types of weapons, and thus the stepping up of the nuclear arms race. Nuclear weapons tests play the part of a substantial destabilizing factor which has a negative effect on the global strategic situation. The ending of nuclear wapons tests would therefore be of tremendous international significance and would be a major step in the direction of reducing the nuclear threat. This long overdue measure would be a major obstacle to the creation of all new types and systems of nuclear weapons.

Guided by precisely these considerations, the Soviet Union drew up a draft treaty on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons tests, and submitted it back in 1975 for examination by the UN General Assembly. The Soviet initiative met with approval at the United Nations from the majority of thw world's states. Nearly 100 delegations voted for this proposal. But it did not receive the support of the other nuclear powers.

Washington covered its refusal to hold talks with arguments about the problems of clarifying the actual circumstances if doubt should arise as to the fulfillment of commitments to end underground nuclear weapons tests. Taking this circumstance into account, in 1976 the Soviet Union submitted an amendment to its own draft treaty on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons tests, making provision for on-the-spot verification on the basis of the principle of voluntariness. This was followed, on the USSR's initiative, by the holding of Soviet-American consultations on a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests in Washington in June 1977. In July of the same year Britain joined the talks.

In the course of the trilateral talks which followed in Geneva, a draft treaty was prepared. The participants in the talks agreed that the treaty would provide for the banning of any test explosions of nuclear weapons anywhere under their jurisdiction or control and in any environment. It was agreed that the treaty would be accompanied by a protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The participants in the trilateral talks agreed that in order to monitor observance of the treaty the participating states will use national technical facilities. The USSR, the United States, and Britain, in a joint report submitted to the disarmament committee 30 July 1980, noted that "the trilateral accord on these general conditions for on-the-spot verification is an important achievement by the participants in the talks in the resolution of questions of the monitoring of the treaty's observance."

In short, a treaty on a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests was in effect already elaborated and prepared, but it did not become a reality, because in 1982 the United States unilaterally stopped participating in the talks aimed at elaborating the final version of the treaty. The prospects of ending nuclear weapons tests do not suit the Reagan administration because it sees this act as a serious hindrance to the implementation of its program for a further buildup of the nuclear arsenal and the attainment of superiority over the Soviet Union.

The United States, closing its eyes to the lessons of the 40 years which have elapsed since the first attempt to establish world domination in the conditions of the possession of a monopoly on the atom bomb, is trying in vain to achieve superiority by means of a breakthrough in the scientific and technical sphere. This is the purpose of the programs to create the potential for the nuclear means for a first disarming strike, the buildup of nonnuclear potential, and work to create the so-called large-scale ABM defense system and space strike arms.

The Pentagon is testing and building up more and more new nuclear arms and is eager to extend them into space. The United States has commissioned new offensive strategic arms systems one after another. But not one of them has added or could add to its confidence in its own invulnerability. The Soviet Union has always given a commensurate answer to U.S. actions. The U.S. hopes of victory in a nuclear war lose their meaning because of the inevitability of nuclear retaliation.

The shortsightedness of attempts to achieve a decisive military superiority over the Soviet Union now being undertaken by Washington is obvious. Whether the American hawks like it or not, our planet is the common home of all of us, and everyone has an equal interest in its safekeeping and security. The instinct of self-preservation is obviously not alien to the American Congress, either. Surely that is indicated by the fact that early this year Congress adopted a number of resolutions calling on the administration to ratify the treaties concluded earlier in this sphere, to declare a moratorium from 6 August 1985, that is, from the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, on nuclear weapons tests, and to resume talks on a general and complete ban on such tests.

The Soviet Union has long been calling on Washington to act in precisely that way. The White House invariably responds to these appeals with a refusal. But it is not too late to display common sense and go to meet the wishes of the broad American and international public. It is up to Washington.

NUCLEAR TESTING

MOSCOW: U.S. INVITATION 'LEGALIZATION' OF EXPLOSIONS

OW310136 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 30 Jul 85

[Text] An announcement was ostentatiously made today in Washington that the U.S. Government has proposed to the Soviet Union that it dispatch a delegation to inspect the next nuclear experiment to be conducted at a test site in Nevada.

White House Deputy Press Secretary Speakes repeatedly plugged this proposal and stressed its profound significance. However, the real purpose of this proposal is something quite different. The United States, which has already reiterated its proposal to the Soviet Union that the two sides exchange nuclear test inspection teams, is planning to provide a chance to merely observe the nuclear explosion. This means a virtual legalization of nuclear explosions. At the same time, the United States has been stubbornly opposed to all measures aimed at banning nuclear arms tests.

NUCLEAR TESTING

BRIEFS

SWEDEN REPORTS USSR EXPLOSION—This laboratory of the Swedish National Defense Research Institute in Hagfors registered seismic signals from an underground nuclear explosion in eastern Kazakhstan in the USSR at about 0500 this morning. This explosion measured 5.3 on the Richter scale. [Excerpt] [Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1600 GMT 25 Jul 85 LD]

TASS ON U.S. UNDERGROUND TEST--Washington July 26 TASS--The United States has conducted another underground test of a nuclear explosive device at a testing ground in the desert of Nevada. According to a spokesman of the U.S. Department of Energy, the yield of the explosion was from 20 to 150 kilotons. This is the ninth officially announced underground nuclear explosion in Nevada since the beginning of the current year. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0721 GMT 26 Jul 85 LD]

CSO: 5200/1334 END